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1ABSTRACT 
The interaction between disjunctive interpersonal relationships, those where the 
parties disagree on the goals of the relationship, and the use of computer mediated 
communications (CMC) channels is a relatively unexplored domain. Bargh (2002) 
suggests that use of CMC channels can amplify the development of interpersonal 
relationships, and notes that the effect is not constant across communication activities. 
This dissertation reports on a line of research that explores the interaction between CMC 
and stalking, a common form of disjunctive relationship. CMC channels can be 
characterized by their richness, interactivity, and distribution (Te'eni 2001). Field data 
from cyberstalking cases is used to examine the effects of CMC channels on stalking case 
severity, and to explore the relative impacts of CMC channel characteristics on such 
cases. To accomplish this, a ratio-scaled measure of stalking case severity is developed 
for exploring the relationship between case severity and CMC media characteristics. This 
includes levels of anonymity, as well as the prior relationship between the stalker and the 
victim. Results show that channel richness and the nature of the prior relationship 
dominate the impact on cyberstalking case severity, while channel interactivity, 
distribution, and harasser anonymity do not affect case severity. In conclusion, this 
analysis of cyberstalking data provides support for Te’eni’s (2001) CAMOC model and 
its interpretation of media richness theory. Further, the analysis provides evidence that 
disjunctive online relationships are different from disjunctive offline relationships only 
2when intimacy is involved. Follow-up research is proposed along with suggestions for the 
development of an improved measure of case severity.  
3CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
Research shows that the use of computer mediated communications (CMC) tools 
and techniques via the Internet can amplify and/or accelerate the development of 
interpersonal relationships (Bargh 2002; Bargh et al. 2002; McKenna et al. 2002; Hian et 
al. 2004), contrary to the expectations of early CMC and information systems researchers 
(Daft and Lengel 1986; Walther 1996; Dennis and Kinney 1998). Bargh postulates that 
this amplification occurs as the result of two main factors. First is the ability of 
individuals with common interests to find each other quickly and easily, even if widely 
separated geographically, using Internet search engines and chat rooms. This search 
capability accelerates the process of discovery of shared mutual interests, which are the 
foundation of stable relationships. Second, Bargh, McKenna and colleagues suggest that 
Internet CMC tools allow individuals to control the quality, quantity and type of 
personality they present online. This provides a means to diminish or temporarily remove 
personal characteristics (such as excessive weight) perceived to be detrimental to the 
initial development of a relationship, but that are more readily overlooked once a bond is 
formed (Bargh et al. 2002; McKenna et al. 2002). This process is shown to accelerate the 
disclosure of the desired persona and results in the strengthening of the relationship with 
the use of CMC tools (Bargh et al. 2002; McKenna et al. 2002).  
4In studying offline relationships, Cupach and Spitzberg (2004) introduce their 
book on obsession and stalking with the suggestion that interpersonal relationships take 
two potential forms. First, “when individuals pursue mutual activities and states, their 
shared relationship may be considered conjunctive in structure. Conversely, when 
relationships are nonmutual, they may be considered disjunctive in structure” (Cupach 
and Spitzberg 2004 p3).  
Research on the longer-term impact of the effects of CMC on interpersonal 
relationships can explore either conjunctive or disjunctive relationships, or both, though 
most research to date has focused on conjunctive research. Only one study has addressed 
the nature of online stalking and online disjunctive relationships. Spitzberg and Hoobler 
(2002) explore cyberstalking, and conclude that it is different from offline stalking, but 
they fail to address the characteristics of cyberstalking in any depth. One line of research 
into CMC has shown that positive long-term effects on social interactions and 
psychological well-being among Internet users (Kraut et al. 2002) can also have 
worrisome consequences, through the reinforcement of “group think” phenomena as it 
occurs among extremist or anti-social groups (Glaser 1983; Spears et al. 2002). 
Additionally, CMC also allows people with extreme perspectives on any topic to find 
others of a like mind, leading to an amplified sense of support and reinforcement of such 
extremist views (Glaser et al. 2002).  
In an organizational environment, Thompson and Nadler (2002) identify a 
negative impact from CMC on complex commercial negotiations where a greater 
understanding of not only the person, but the nuances of finer communication and the 
dynamic complexity of negotiation are required. While not completely disjunctive, such 
5negotiating relationships exhibit distrust and diverging ideas of the optimal outcome. This 
is the polar opposite to stalking, where a disjunctive relationship already exists and the 
communication of threat requires only baseline reading of the recipient’s response. Many 
other forms of relationships are disjunctive, but as Cupach and Spitzberg observe, “…few 
seem so prototypical of disjunction as stalking and obsessive relational intrusion” (2004 
p3). While much of the focus in past research on CMC is on relatively benign, 
conjunctive relationships, there are still substantial opportunities to research CMC usage 
and impacts in more disjunctive environments. For the purposes of this research, the 
focus will remain on disjunctive personal relationships. 
Research Question 
This leads to the following question: If the Internet and CMC tools can accelerate 
or amplify the development of conjunctive interpersonal relationships, what is its 
corresponding ability to amplify (or dampen) the impacts when a relationship is 
disjunctive in nature? While this is a broad question to answer, since there are a 
substantial number of reasons a relationship can be disjunctive (Cupach and Spitzberg 
2004), this paper seeks to explore cyberstalking, a specific type of disjunctive 
relationship which may be influenced by CMC media effects.  
One common outcome of the process of relationship dissolution is characterized 
by harassment of one person (commonly the person initiating the dissolution) by the 
other. Such harassment can take one of two common forms: obsessive relational intrusion 
(ORI, also known as hyperintimacy), in which the pursuer attempts to restore or 
strengthen the relationship, or stalking, where the pursuer is attempting to punish the 
6object of pursuit (Cupach and Spitzberg 1998, 2004). Cyberstalking uses Internet and 
CMC tools to accomplish ORI activities during the process of stalking. Understanding 
stalking and cyberstalking is of particular interest to wide variety of disciplines: 
academics, legal and clinical practitioners, and Internet service providers, all of whom 
must deal with the direct and side effects of ORI, stalking, and cyberstalking activities.  
This paper first examines CMC processes associated with cyberstalking and the 
relative impact of CMC usage on cyberstalking victims, thus exploring one facet of the 
impact of CMC usage on disjunctive relationships. Secondly, it explores key 
characteristics of CMC channels and the impacts these independent characteristics have 
on cyberstalking cases.  
Te’eni (2001) suggests three dimensions to communications media that may 
affect the medium’s ability to convey stalking messages: 
• interactivity (e.g. real time or delayed),  
• richness (e.g. support for verbal communications),  
• and type of distribution (e.g. typically private (peer-to-peer email) or public 
(blog)).  
Additionally, CMC may provide the sender an effective form of anonymity, 
which may impact the cyberstalking victim in various ways. This research project began 
to explore these interactions using cyberstalking case histories, as a prelude to more 
focused future research on the topic.  
7Organization of the Paper 
Chapter II introduces the reader to stalking and cyberstalking. It also identifies 
two dimensions of stalking. The first classifies stalking cases by the prior relationship 
between the stalker and the victim. The second identifies the location of the relationship, 
specifically if it an online or offline relationship. Types of online media used for stalking, 
as well as types of online and offline stalking actions taken, type of threat, and CMC 
moderator variables are also described. Chapter II also briefly reviews Te’eni’s (2001) 
Cognitive-Affective Model of Communications and adapts the CMC channel 
characteristics identified by Te’eni into a trio of dimensions that can be easily identified 
and manipulated in an experiment. Chapter III develops a working model, and details the 
research hypotheses identified for testing with the available cyberstalking case data. 
Chapter IV introduces the cyberstalking case histories used in this research, and details 
the calculation of an index of case severity using the Analytic Hierarchy Process that was 
used as the dependant variable. A testing methodology is also described in this section. 
Chapter V presents the results, with indications of support for the hypothesis developed 
in Chapter III. Chapter VI is a discussion of the implication of this research for academic 
research and its value to the practitioner community. Included is a discussion on the 
limitations of this research activity and suggestions for future research, and the chapter 
ends with the conclusions drawn from this project.  
8CHAPTER II  
BACKGROUND 
Cyberstalking research sits squarely at the intersection of the research domains of 
sociology and computer mediated communications (CMC). Each of theses domains has a 
rich and deep background, but only recently has the full breadth of this intersection begun 
to be explored (Bargh 2002). Much of the existing research within this intersection deals 
with the positive, or normative, aspects of computer mediated communications (Bargh 
2002; Cupach and Spitzberg 2004). This is reasonable, as it helps to first establish a 
baseline against which exceptions and disruptions may be compared. Cyberstalking is 
one such exception, capturing communications and harassing actions involving parties in 
disjunctive relationships. The research into cyberstalking reported here relies on 
knowledge of interpersonal communications processes, as well as the more personal 
aspects of relationship development and dissolution that flow from the sociological 
domain. It also requires a view of the information technology that influences not only the 
channel and form of communication, but also can intentionally or unintentionally distort 
or alter perceptions of the messages communicated between the sender and receiver of 
electronic transmissions (Te'eni 2001).  
This chapter explores the existing research literature into both communications 
media as a communications channel and the impacts of communications as a vehicle for 
stalking and harassment associated with disjunctive interpersonal relationships. First, the 
9characteristics of communications media that may affect the impact of harassing 
messages are explored. Then harassment, stalking, and cyberstalking are introduced as 
they are currently understood in the research literature, leading to the specific hypotheses 
that are addressed by this paper, which are defined in Chapter III.  
Cyberstalking as a Communicative Act 
Reviewing the literature related to interpersonal communications, Te’eni (2001) 
assembled many elements of research around organizational and interpersonal 
communications into a comprehensive model of interpersonal and organizational 
communications that drew on media richness theory (Daft and Lengel 1986), the task-
technology fit model (Zigurs and Buckland 1998), and a variety of other sources (e.g. 
Habermas 1984; Habermas and Cooke 1998; Straub and Karahanna 1998). Te’eni 
identifies this model as the cognitive-affective model for organizational communications 
(CAMOC) and develops a blueprint for its use in the development of technology in 
support of organizational needs.  
A Cognitive-Affective Model of Organizational Communication
Te’eni’s (2001) cognitive-affective model of organizational communications, or 
CAMOC, is useful as a lens for viewing the relationship between a stalker’s goals, their 
strategy, the communications media, the message, and the outcome. Figure 1 presents 
Te’eni’s CAMOC, which is briefly described and applied to stalking and cyberstalking in 
the following paragraphs.  
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Figure 1: A Cognitive-Affective Model of Organizational Communication (adapted 
from Te'eni 2001 Figure 1)  
 
While understanding the motivations of stalkers is beyond the scope of this work, 
such motivations include “… either deliberately or unconsciously, [to] seek control over 
their victim” (Finch 2001 p47). Conceptually, the social sciences have viewed affect (e.g. 
intimacy, love, affiliation, communion) and power (dominance, control, status) as both 
the primary axes of social life and generally orthogonal to each other (Birtchnell 1993). 
Cupach and Spitzberg extend this to stalking (and its common antecedent obsessive 
relational intrusion—both are defined later in this chapter), with power and affect 
providing motives, either independently or together, for either control over of the victim, 
or persuasive attempts to convince the victim that the stalker’s perspective is honorable 
(Cupach and Spitzberg 2004 p57). Other research indicates that almost half of all stalkers 
are individuals seeking to persuade a former intimate partner to return to the relationship, 
or failing that, to punish the victim for not responding to the stalkers overtures (Zona et 
al. 1993; Pathe and Mullen 1997; Meloy 1998; Mullen et al. 1999; Tjaden and Thoennes 
2000; Sheridan et al. 2001a; Cupach and Spitzberg 2004). Most other stalkers have a 
11
similar goal, but begin with a different relationship to the victim (Tjaden and Thoennes 
1998; Sheridan et al. 2001b; Spitzberg and Hoobler 2002).  
Punishment (or control, since both represent the use of power) and persuasion 
(representing affect) thus become task inputs into the communications process under 
study here (see Figure 1). Te’eni’s identifies two dimensions for the second input, 
cognitive distance (differences in knowledge or understanding of the topic), and affective 
distance (the emotional gap), each of which represents a difference between the state of 
the stalker, or sender, and the state of the victim, or receiver. Te’eni’s third input, values 
and norms, represents cultural knowledge that guide behavior related to communications 
within that culture (Te'eni 2001 p257). This trio of inputs collectively affects the various 
elements of the communications process used to deliver the senders message(s) to the 
receiver.  
Within the communications process, the goal associated with each message is 
related to the impact desired. Te’eni (2001) addresses the organizational context with the 
CAMOC, but as Cupach and Spitzberg note  
“Most existing theory and research on relational and interpersonal 
competence propose skills such as message management, coorientation, 
and adaptability for the purpose of engendering mutual respect and 
sustenance of ongoing dialogue. Yet mutual respect and sustenance of 
dialogue are often precisely the objectives the unwanted pursuer seeks to 
impose on the victim, and precisely what the victim seeks to deny the 
stalker.” (Cupach and Spitzberg 2004 p157, emphasis in original).  
Thus Te’eni’s CAMOC must be validated for use with disjunctive relationships before 
such relationships can be used to address questions associated with the communications 
process. Such use is foreseen by Te’eni, who states “The criterion for choosing the 
landmarks for the central path [through the model] concerns how to best uncover the 
12
process of communication so that others can forge new paths along similar lines for new 
conditions.” (Te'eni 2001 p256).  
Validating CAMOC With Respect to Disjunctive Relationships
The CAMOC is a two layer model, consisting of inputs, impacts (outputs), and a 
channel (the communications process) between the sender and receiver, as shown in 
Figure 1. Initial validation requires that the inputs and outputs be compatible with the 
model. If the higher layer of inputs and outputs are compatible, then no changes are 
needed to the lower communications process layer when the communications processes 
are used in support of communications associated with a disjunctive relationship.  
To validate the inputs and outputs requires that one first understand the 
assumptions that underlie the CAMOC. Taking the outputs first, begin with the fact that 
Te’eni based the CAMOC on Habermas’s theory of communicative action (Habermas 
1984; Habermas and Cooke 1998; Te'eni 2001). The theory of communicative action 
provides a notion of successful communications between humans (Habermas 1984). 
Habermas (1984) claims that four conditions are necessary for a communicative act  to 
take place: 
• the act must be comprehensible, so that the receiver can understand the 
sender; 
• the act must be true, so that the receiver can share the sender’s knowledge; 
• intentions must be expressed truthfully, so that the receiver can trust the 
sender; and  
• the act must be appropriate within some normative context so that the receiver 
can agree with the sender within this value system. (Habermas 1984)     
13
As noted by Cupach and Spitzberg, the scientific literature is generally in agreement with 
Habermas (Cupach and Spitzberg 2004, see quote above). Successful communications 
generally follows a positive norm, wherein both parties to the communicative act increase 
their mutual understanding and improve the relationship (Habermas 1984; Te'eni 2001 
p261). The inverse is also accepted, since IS researchers commonly characterizes 
impediments to action and relationship as poor communications (Te'eni 2001). This 
aligns with Cupach and Spitzberg’s (2004) notion of conjunctive relationships. For this 
study of disjunctive relationships, this definition of communications success must be 
modified in two areas.  
First, note that in terms of a communications channel, the direction of the 
cognitive-affective impact does not matter, but the magnitude does. That is to say, there 
is a difference between size and direction. The channel can reduce the ability to convey 
meaning if it does not have sufficient capacity. However, a given channel can carry 
information damaging to a relationship of a given cognitive or affective magnitude just as 
easily as it can carry information conducive to the relationship at the same cognitive or 
affective magnitude. For this reason, the magnitude of the impact is more significant than 
the direction (e.g. positive or negative) of the impact when studying a communications 
channel. Applying this in the context of harassment, a harassing message will increase 
mutual understanding, while also causing a strong, negative affective response within the 
receiver, leading to a decrease in trust and injury to the relationship (Sheridan et al. 
2001a). Given that some stalkers seek to harass or injure, we must accept that, from the 
senders perspective, a harassing message leading to a negative affective impact on the 
receiver is successful. However important the victim’s view, for the purpose of this 
14
research it is necessary to approach this from the stalker’s perspective, since it is the 
sender-stalker that makes the choices about channel and message. Thus for the purposes 
of this study, the definition of success of the communicative act must carefully be 
constrained to mean a change of affect, without concern for the direction of the change. 
We conclude then that the more severe the impact on the victim, the more effective the 
communications channel was in transmitting the intended message from stalker to victim.  
The second change associated with communications success addresses Te’eni’s 
notion of cultural norms and values (Te'eni 2001). Returning to CAMOC’s inputs, note 
first that persuasion is one of the core functions (goals) of the communicative act 
(Habermas 1984; Habermas and Cooke 1998; Te'eni 2001), and is a direct goal of many 
stalkers (Sheridan et al. 2001b; Spitzberg 2002). Thus a stalker message motivated by a 
need to influence or persuade the victim is clearly compatible with the CAMOC as a task 
input, but will fail to achieve the impact intended by the stalker due to its incompatibility 
with cultural norms and values as accepted by the receiver-victim. Alternatively, a stalker 
may be motivated by a need to punish the victim. This is harder to reconcile with the 
CAMOC, as the CAMOC assumes that all participants agree on a group goal at some 
higher level, and that the intent of any communications is to enable action towards such a 
goal. Fundamentally, stalkers and their victims fail to share a common goal. However, 
victims will generally agree that a negative message is harmful, which implies agreement 
with the harasser at one level, if the harasser’s message is intended to punish. In this case, 
the stalkers message is successful, even though it violates cultural norms and values 
against harassment and negative messages.  
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This leads to the conclusion that a violation of cultural norms and values does not 
necessarily invalidate the senders perception of (or the actual) success when the intent is 
(consciously or subconsciously) to violate cultural norms and values. Thus the second 
change to the definition of communications success needed is that when addressing 
communications between parties in disjunctive relationships, such communications will 
often violate cultural norms and values. Such a violation may be intended by the sender, 
and if intended, has the potential to amplify the impact of the message, leading to 
successful communication from the perspective of the sender.  
Most importantly, a violation of cultural norms and values associated with the 
generation of a message stream’s content does not necessarily affect the communications 
processes associated with delivering that message stream across some communications 
channel to the receiver. An example may be useful here. Consider the common 
management nostrum of praise in public, discipline in private, taken here at face value as 
a cultural norm. If a manager disciplines someone in public, the action either adds 
significance to the discipline by making it public (implying a more significant infraction), 
or it demonstrates the manager’s inability to adhere to a cultural value. The difference 
between the two alternatives is determined by the true significance of the infraction, and 
any formal rules associated with the discipline process (cultural norms again). Neither 
alternative has any impact on the communications process once one is chosen by the 
manager, and both cases use a communications process to effectively communicate with 
the recipient(s).  
Development of a proof that violations of cultural norms and values will fail to 
affect the communications process is beyond the scope of this paper, and may be 
16
practically impossible. Since it is possible that violations do not affect the 
communications process, as shown by the preceding example, the assumption is made 
that such violations are not harmful to the communications process under study, and thus 
that punishing messages sent by a stalker or harasser can be effectively delivered by the 
communications process outline in Te’eni’s (2001) CAMOC.  
The next section briefly describes these communications processes, and defines 
three characteristics of media that are tested in this project for their impact on stalking 
case severity.  
Communications Processes
Referring again to Figure 1 showing Te’eni’s (2001) CAMOC, the inner layer 
addresses the communications processes. First, message goals are derived from the 
sender’s motivation as captured in the inputs for task, distance, norms, and values 
associated with the communications. Message strategies, media choices, and message 
forms are chosen by the sender to serve that goal, and will reflect the inherent limitations 
of these elements. For example, an asynchronous medium will not be used in supporting 
a task requiring high levels of interaction and dialog. Assuming that the sender (and 
receiver) has a modicum of experience with the available media, types of message forms, 
and necessary strategies, such experience will enable effective translation of the message 
goal into an appropriate set of media and message form choices (Te'eni 2001).  
Implicit in this process is an understanding of the limitations of the media used, 
with the limitations characterized in multiple dimensions. Te’eni suggests three 
characteristic dimensions of channels that are likely affect the senders choice of medium 
(relative to some intended strategy): channel capacity, interactivity, and adaptiveness 
17
(Te'eni 2001 p271). Channel capacity in this context is not the raw bit rate, but rather the 
ability of the channel to support a variety of verbal and non-verbal cues and hints that a 
perceptive receiver can use to interpret the message content (Te'eni 2001 p271; Kock 
2004), and is often known as channel or media richness. Interactivity relates to the ability 
of the channel to support real time dialog between the parties (Te'eni 2001). Finally, 
adaptiveness in Te’eni’s (2001) terms is the ability of a medium to tailor a message for a 
given recipient. Thus, blogs and bulletin boards are less adaptive than personal email. 
Te’eni cites only one study of adaptiveness, Adams et al. (1993), suggesting a paucity of 
research in this area. The following paragraphs examine these characteristics in more 
detail.  
Media richness has long been suggested as a characteristic of a communications 
channel that affects the ability of that channel to support messages with varying levels of 
cogitative and affective content (Daft and Lengel 1986; Carlson 1995; Zigurs and 
Buckland 1998). More recent research has failed to support the full breadth of the 
original media richness theory (Dennis and Kinney 1998; Dennis et al. 1999). However, 
Kock (2004) divides media types into two groups, those that support natural speech (face-
to-face, video, phone) and those that do not (i.e. text-based), thus limiting the scope of the 
richness dimension. This research uses Kock’s definition of richness, dividing the 
existing media technologies into verbal and textual media, and uses cyberstalking case 
information to test the effects of richness on case severity.  
Interactivity, or the delay imposed on a message as it transits the media, captures 
the difference between real time or synchronous communications and delayed or 
asynchronous communications. Te’eni identifies it as “the potential for immediate 
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feedback from the receiver” (Te'eni 2001 p271), and suggests that higher levels of 
interactivity facilitates control through testing and adjustment as a response to instant 
feedback. Such dynamic controls are necessary in situations that exhibit high levels of 
dynamic complexity (McLaughlin 1984). Further, interactivity requires that the 
participant be able to respond “on the fly” to an unpredictable progression in the dialog, 
making it more difficult, and potentially a liability to the sender (Te'eni 2001). This 
research sorts media into two categories of interactivity, real time and delayed, and tests 
the impacts of this division on cyberstalking case severity, as described below in Chapter 
III.  
Te’eni suggests that adaptiveness is necessary when the strategy of the sender 
requires that the message be tailored for a particular recipient, and that some 
communications media are more adaptable than others. Channels with higher levels of 
adaptiveness should be more attractive to stalkers who are seeking to address their 
messages to a particular victim. While not identical, the message distribution mechanism 
used by a media can be seen as a proxy for Te’eni’s adaptiveness construct (Te'eni 2001 
p274). Distribution mechanisms can take on a similar role, by providing control to the 
sender over how and when the recipient receives a message. Distribution mechanisms can 
be divided into two subgroups, private and public, that can also be thought of as sender-
driven and recipient-driven, respectively. Private distribution mechanisms, such as the 
telephone and email, are controlled by the sender, who chooses the recipient of the 
message. Recipients of publicly distributed communications are not controlled by the 
sender. Rather, the sender posts the message in a public place, and anyone is welcome to 
read (or listen to) it. In practice, recipients will choose to “subscribe” to a public channel, 
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and then choose (or not) to read each message posted there. Public distribution is typified 
by broadcast radio, newspapers, websites, and blogs. This division captures the difference 
between CMC media that are effectively private (or peer-to-peer), with the sender 
specifically identifying the recipients, and those that are distributed more widely (e.g. to 
the public), with the recipient choosing to subscribe to the channel and further choosing 
to read (or listen to) each message or not. This research tests the difference in impacts on 
cyberstalking case severity associated with the use of public and private distribution 
mechanisms used by various media.  
Channel Characteristics of CMC Tools 
Table 1 shows the association of a variety of current CMC tools, organized with 
these three channel characteristics of richness, interactivity, and distribution. Note that 
there are no known applications that fit the public verbal interactive category, although 
one colleague argued that a “Boston Commons” type public space would qualify if it 
existed today. In a limitation of this research, the data used for this project (discussed in 
Chapter IV) does not contain any cases that specifically identify the public verbal delayed 
category, and only two cases that mention voice mail in the private verbal delayed 
category, thus effectively constraining this research to the remaining five categories 
shown.  
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Table 1: CMC Channel Characteristic Map 
 Richness: Verbal Richness: Text 
Interactivity: Real Time Delayed Real Time Delayed 
Distribution: 
Private 
FTF, Phone, 
Video Conf, 
Webcam 
Voice Mail IM, ICQ, 
(Hacking?) 
Email, SMS, 
Postal Mail, 
Ecards 
Distribution: 
Public 
None Known Broadcasting, 
Movies, YouTube 
Chat, Game 
Forums 
Blogs, Lists, Msg. 
Boards, 
Websites, Ebay 
ratings, Usenet, 
Wiki Entries 
In summary, this section has shown that disjunctive relationships generating 
harassing cyberstalking activities and messages violate only the cultural norms and 
values inputs associated with use of communications processes, and that such violations 
are associated with the direction of the impact. Specifically, cultural norms assume that 
successful communications will decrease the cognitive and/or affective distance between 
the parties, and that higher levels of change are good. In disjunctive communications 
associated with punishment, the impact will increase the cognitive and/or affective 
distance between the parties, violating the assumed cultural norm. Having no evidence to 
the contrary, and noting that proof is beyond the scope of this paper, the assumption is 
made that such a change in the direction of cognitive or affective impact on the victim 
has no impact on the functioning of the communications process used to support the 
message. Thus stalking cases can provide us with tests of the ability of communications 
media to affect disjunctive relationships, which are more fully detailed in the next 
section.  
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Stalking, Cyberstalking, and Online Harassment 
The academic literature generally defines stalking as “a series of actions directed 
at one individual by another that taken as a whole amount to unwanted persistent personal 
harassment” (Sheridan et al. 2001b p152). Goode (1995) suggests that stalking is a 
pattern or “course of conduct” of intentional harassment intended to cause emotional 
distress. Obsessive relational intrusion (ORI), which is closely related to stalking, 
consists of excessive efforts on the part of the perpetrator to develop a relationship with a 
victim, often to the extent that normally positive acts take on negative connotations in the 
perception of the victim (Sheridan et al. 2001a; Cupach and Spitzberg 2004). A common 
working definition encompasses stalking and ORI (along with persistent harassment not 
originating from a close relationship), as it is the perception of the victim that legally 
determines if harassment is taking place (Cupach and Spitzberg 1998, 2004). Further, 
since even relatively mild efforts at such courtship often cross the threshold of threat and 
fear by virtue of their repetition (Cupach and Spitzberg 2000), and the fact that ORI can 
easily morph into stalking, it is very likely that some cases labeled stalking are actually 
cases of ORI (Emerson et al. 1998). Since the differences between ORI and stalking are 
only minimally important for the purposes of this study (Harmon et al. 1995), which 
approaches the topic from the victim’s perspective and avoids direct analysis of the 
perpetrators motive, this paper will use a somewhat relaxed definition of the term 
stalking, which includes both “classic,” or criminal, stalking and more aggressive forms 
of ORI, unless otherwise noted.  
Cyberstalking is stalking perpetrated exclusively or largely with computer 
mediated communications (CMC) and/or a wide variety of other online applications and 
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services (Spitzberg and Hoobler 2002).1 CMC can provide support for offline stalkers, as 
a tool in their kit (Spitzberg and Hoobler 2002), or a cyberstalker can operate purely 
online, even when the victim is not a regular user of the Internet. The former includes the 
example of a stalker using the Internet to collect information about an offline victim. The 
latter is demonstrated in the case of Gary S. Dellapenta, who severely traumatized his 
victim via personal ads placed on the Internet (Miller 1999b). Cyberstalking has recently 
become a recognized phenomena (Miceli et al. 2001; D'Ovidio and Doyle 2003), but 
there have been only a few pilot studies of its prevalence and impacts on victims 
(Spitzberg and Hoobler 2002; Finn 2004; Alexy et al. 2005).  
There appears to a shortage of studies that attempt to characterize cyberstalking 
by the methods and media used by the cyberstalker, or how use of those methods 
correlated to their impacts on the severity of the case. Thus, one focus of the first part of 
the larger research program is on the CMC choices of cyberstalkers and the resulting 
impacts on their victims. This is accomplished using 1150 cyberstalking case histories 
from a victim’s advocacy group that include a wide variety of CMC tools and techniques 
that go well beyond the ubiquitous email and instant messaging services that are 
commonly included in research into CMC. These case histories will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter IV of this manuscript. 
As a practical matter, this paper will separate serious stalking from lesser forms of 
conflict with stalking defined to be continued threats or harassing actions by the stalker 
after clearly being told to stop at least once. This paper adopts this definition as the 
working definition of cyberstalking, since it is the one used by the victim’s advocacy 
 
1 In practice the term cyberstalking also encompasses some cases better classified as online incidents of 
ORI.  
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group, Working to Halt Online Abuse (WHOA 2006). Note that this definition includes 
some “school yard bullying” and other forms of minor harassment, and is not limited to 
formerly intimate relationships. However, it does not generally include workplace or 
sexual harassment that is merely denigrating to the object of the harassment, due to the 
generally transient nature of such harassment, and the lack of any implied or explicit 
threat to the victim.  
Rosenfeld (2004) suggests some caution in the use of the terms stalker and victim:  
Regardless of whether researchers have chosen to label their subjects as 
stalkers, obsessional followers, obsessional harassers, or erotomanics, 
most have essentially targeted the same offender population. Hence, for 
the sake of consistency, the term stalker is used here with the caveat that 
many of these individuals have not actually stalked (i.e., followed in a 
stealthy manner) their victim(s). It should also be noted that the use of the 
term victim in reference to the target of stalking is also somewhat 
controversial, with many writers preferring the term survivor (despite the 
unfortunate fact that not all victims survive the stalking experience) or 
target. Despite this controversy, the term victim is retained here with the 
acknowledgment that no negative connotations are intended by the use of 
the term (Rosenfeld 2004 p10).  
This paper adopts Rosenfeld’s terms and respective definitions for “stalker” and “victim.” 
Further, this paper uses “harasser” and “perpetrator” as synonymous with “stalker.”  
Dimensions of Stalking 
While stalking is an old phenomenon, understanding it is has become the focus of 
research efforts only since the mid 1990s. More recently, it is becoming clear that 
classifying stalking and its less severe antecedents, harassment, bullying, hyperintimacy, 
and obsessive relational intrusion (Cupach and Spitzberg 1998), requires several 
dimensions. These include the context (e.g. personal or work, online or offline) and 
nature of the relationship and its origin (Harmon et al. 1995), the nature of the attachment 
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between the perpetrator and victim (e.g. conjunctive or disjunctive, Zona et al. 1993; 
Harmon et al. 1995; Cupach and Spitzberg 2004), and the form or severity of the 
harassment (Cupach and Spitzberg 1998; Sheridan et al. 2001b; Spitzberg 2002). Less 
clear is the time dimension. Some forms of harassment are shorter in nature, and one 
study found a distinct difference between incidents lasting less than two weeks and those 
lasting longer (Purcell et al. 2004). These dimensions are discussed  in the following 
paragraphs.  
The Relationship Intimacy Level
Initiating an interpersonal relationship is difficult. Ending an intimate relationship 
is nearly always more difficult, and invariably results in pain to both parties (Heinlein 
1966 p259-60). Emerson et al. (1998) suggest that stalking is most likely to originate as a 
relationship begins or ends, and that most cases of stalking are a dynamic process that 
evolve from a normal relationship through hyperintimacy (or ORI) into classic stalking. 
This is supported by the evidence, which suggests that upwards of 50% of classic stalking 
cases resulted from the dissolution of some form of intimate relationship, either as 
spouses, sexual partners, or a dating relationships that lasted more than a few weeks 
(Tjaden and Thoennes 1998, 2000; Spitzberg 2002). Emerson et al. (1998) extensively 
explore the qualitative nature of the development of the ongoing relationship between the 
stalker and the victim over time, and note that most incidents of stalking begin 
innocuously, and that most victims only recognize it as stalking retrospectively.  
With respect to stalking associated with domestic violence, a variety of 
researchers have developed typologies of stalking relationships (e.g. Zona et al. 1993; 
Goode 1995; Spitzberg and Cupach 1998; Sheridan et al. 2001b; Spitzberg and Hoobler 
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2002; Mohandie et al. 2006; Roberts and Dziegielewski 2006). Sheridan et al. (2001a) 
captures a concise typology, providing for five main categories:  
• Domestic violence stalking by a current or former intimate partner. 
• Domestic violence stalking by another family member. 
• Stalking by friends/acquaintances.  
• Stalking by strangers/erotomanics.  
• Stalking by unknown or anonymous stalkers.  
This paper uses Sheridan’s typology to characterize the relationships between stalker and 
victim in this research, with a further extension representing the context in which the 
relationship began.  
The Context of the Relationship
This dimension is intended to capture the context of the relationship, in the sense 
of where the stalker meets and interacts with the victim. Traditionally, this meant 
interaction at work, at school, in some public place, or at a social event of some nature. 
For this study, the context of interest is “online” or “offline,” thus characterizing the 
relationship as purely online, or one that exists offline and uses online tools for 
communications.  
Today, some of the most popular web sites on the Internet are social networking 
sites, some of which are explicitly designed to facilitate the process of initiating 
relationships. McKenna et al. (2002) reported on the history and evolution of such online 
relationships, and the progression from email and Internet relay chat (IRC) to 
conversation over the telephone to meeting in person. This research has produced a 
variety of interesting results. Bargh et al. (2002) and McKenna et al. (2002) together 
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show that use of CMC allows individuals to more easily present their “true selves” and, 
on the receiving side, map that to the receiver’s ideal of the person presented. This 
accelerates the formation of relationships, and often leads to long-term friendships and 
offline intimacy (McKenna et al. 2002). Supporting this conclusion, Hian et al. (2004) 
demonstrated that contrary to expectations, CMC actually accelerated the development of 
relations over face-to-face communications in zero-history dyads in a organizational 
environment. They base their work on the hyperpersonal communications model 
proposed by Walther (1996).  
This leads to the question of how the Internet affects the harassment acts of 
stalkers. Clearly, some harassing acts translate easily into the online realm, such as use of 
email or other forms of messaging to propose dates, etc. Similarly, verbal and written 
threats can easily be transmitted using CMC tools. Conversely, direct physical aggression 
is not possible online. In the middle, there is considerable scope for the misuse of 
information systems with the aim of harassing a victim. Forms of such harassment can 
include but are not limited to impersonation of the victim, identity theft leading to 
fraudulent use of same, theft or misuse of intellectual property, and various forms of 
reputational harassment and slander. As the present research activity directly involves the 
difference between online and offline relationships and communications channels, this 
context dimension represents a key construct in the model developed in the next chapter.  
Anonymous Stalkers
Unknown or anonymous stalkers represent a special case of the relationship and 
context dimensions. While relatively rare in the classic stalking literature (Sheridan et al. 
2001b; Cupach and Spitzberg 2004), CMC tools provide an easy means for a cyberstalker 
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to remain anonymous to unsophisticated users and some ability to remain hidden from 
even the most sophisticated of network experts in practice (Berthold et al. 2000). Only a 
few studies clearly distinguished between stalking by strangers and anonymous stalkers 
(e.g. Sheridan et al. 2001b; Spitzberg 2002). These are not necessarily the same thing. 
Strangers are individuals otherwise unknown to the victim at the onset of the stalking 
activity, but who do not necessarily try to hide their identity. Anonymous stalkers hide 
their identity, and may be strangers, but may also be friends, acquaintances, family 
members, or former intimates known to the victim, but that are not known to be the 
stalker, even after a substantial number of harassing acts have occurred.  
The use of anonymity as a construct has a long history in group support system 
research showing that use of anonymous communications can impact the willingness of a 
subject to communicate, and that it can change the content of the message sent (Connolly 
et al. 1990; Zigurs and Buckland 1998; Dennis et al. 2001). Theoretically, this is based on 
the removal of potential negative consequences to the sender (Connolly et al. 1990; 
Dennis et al. 2001). A desire for anonymity on the part of a stalker will likely influence 
the choice of communications media, eliminating the richest media since face-to-face 
contact and, to a lesser extent, voice contact via telephone do not generally allow the 
stalker to remain anonymous. Maintaining anonymity can also be seen as a goal that 
limits a stalker’s communications strategy choices within Te’eni’s (2001) model of 
interpersonal communications processes.  
The Form of Attachment
With respect to the third dimension, attachment, Harmon et al. (1995) note that 
the form of attachment between the stalker and victim can take on one of two aspects: 
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first, an affectionate or amorous attraction, where the stalker is attempting to win over the 
victim, but is being rebuffed by the victim, and second, a persecutory or angry 
attachment, where the aim of the activity is punishment for some perceived wrong. 
Several researchers note that the practical differences between these aspects is smaller 
than it first appears (Harmon et al. 1995; Cupach and Spitzberg 1998; McCann 2001; 
Cupach and Spitzberg 2004). Emerson et al. (1998) note that the shift from ORI to 
stalking consistently occurs late in the typical evolution of a stalker/victim relationship, 
and is marked by the realization on the part of the stalker that their overtures have failed. 
Further, it is often only at this point in the relationship that the victim will label the 
efforts of the perpetrator as stalking, and that the stalker and victim agree on the nature of 
the relationship (ergo, that it is classic stalking) (Emerson et al. 1998).  
There has been significant research into how the motivation of stalkers differs 
from that of non-stalkers, and the related development of clinical psychopathologies of 
stalkers. As this is beyond the scope of the present research, the interested reader is 
referred to Cupach and Spitzberg (2004) for a review of recent research in this area. 
Research to date provides no evidence that use of CMC tools affects the motivations of 
stalkers, or that the form of attachment varies between classic offline stalkers and 
cyberstalkers. Similarly, there is no evidence of any differences in the motivation of ORI 
perpetrators operating online or offline (Spitzberg and Hoobler 2002).  
Temporal Dimension
There are two time dimensions in stalking. First is the evolution of the stalking 
process within a given case, as noted above. Both Emerson et al. (1998) and Cupach and 
Spitzberg (2004) address this in some detail, noting that what is known is less than ideal, 
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since it has not been possible to observe cases in a true longitudinal fashion. It is only in 
the latter stages of the process that the parties and observers typically identify the case as 
stalking. Further, these same authors note that classic stalking is often episodic, with 
specific events marking the progression of the case.  
The second time dimension represents the duration of the case. Cupach and 
Spitzberg (2004) also address this dimension, reviewing 43 prior studies that collected 
data on the duration of stalking cases. Definitional differences confound their analysis, 
but their meta-analysis indicates that typical stalking cases last around 22 months 
(calculated as the mean of reported central tendency data). For example, Sheridan et al. 
(2001a) analyzed 95 cases handled at a victim’s support clinic in the UK, and found that 
14% ended in less than a year, only 29% had ended at the time of the survey, and that 
14% were still active 10 years after the initiation of stalking activities. One case had been 
active for more than 43 years.  
It appears that duration is a good indicator of the nature of the harassment. Purcell 
et al. (2004) used a large sample survey to test for differences in the impacts of shorter or 
longer stalking incidents, and found a significant break at 2 weeks. They found that 
psychological damage to the victim was more severe for cases longer than 2 weeks, a 
finding echoed by Mullen et al. (2000). Purcell et al. (2004) reported that short incidents 
(45% of stalking incidents) generally involved strangers (75.5%), averaged only 2 days in 
duration, and the median number of harassing acts (“intrusions”) reported by this group 
was five (range: 2 – 40). Long incidents generally involved stalkers known to the victim 
(82.5% overall, 21.4% were former intimates, 30.3% were acquaintances, 22.2% were 
from a work context, and 8.5% were estranged family or friends), and involved more 
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harassing acts (median of 20, range 8 – 85). The median duration for long incidents was 6 
months, with a modal length of 12 months. Purcell et al. (2004) conclude by noting that 
the 2 week time frame is sufficient to demonstrate that the perpetrator’s behavior is 
purposeful, and will likely lead to a much longer and more severe incident.  
Harassing Acts 
Legal definitions of stalking all center around a pattern of “persistent personal 
harassment” (Sheridan et al. 2001b p152) whereby the individual acts may or may not, in 
themselves, be considered harassment. They concluded that, like fine art, stalking is easy 
to spot but hard to characterize. Such harassment can cover a very broad range of acts 
and often does so even during the progress of a single case of stalking. Spitzberg (2002), 
in a significant meta-analysis, developed a typology of stalking based on the actions of 
stalkers found in his literature review. Spitzberg grouped the actions into seven categories 
of roughly increasing severity, as defined in Table 2, and suggests that this set of 
categories can become a framework for the development of measurement schemes of 
stalking activity (Spitzberg 2002 p272). This paper uses Spitzberg’s categories as the 
basis for a case severity index, as described further in Chapter IV. 
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Table 2: Typology of Stalker Actions (Spitzberg 2002) 
I. Hyperintimacy Expressions of affection; Excessive courtship behaviors; 
Excessive communications attempts; many unwanted gifts.  
II. Pursuit, Proximity, & 
Surveillance 
Lying in wait; Synchronizing activities; Unauthorized photos; 
Following; Drive-bys.  
III. Invasion, Theft, 
Vandalism 
Violation of legitimate privacy; Invasion; Information theft; 
Property theft or damage.  
IV. Proxy Pursuit & 
Intrusion 
Involve third parties for information gathering or proximity 
opportunities; Intimidate via intermediaries.  
V. Intimidation, Slander, & 
False Charges 
Threats; Sabotage and Reputational Harassment; Blackmail; 
Threats of disclosure to employer; Making false claims to 
social services.  
VI. Coercion & Constraint Forceful limiting of victim’s options or behaviors; Extortion; 
Use of physical force; Kidnapping.  
VII. Aggression Assault on property, pets, self, or others; Violence towards 
victim; Rape; Endangerment. 
With respect to online harassment, Spitzberg listed calls, electronic contacts, and 
notes/messages/photos sent under hyperintimacy, information theft under invasion, and 
verbal or written harassment under the intimidation category (Spitzberg 2002). Hacking 
and impersonation online were not included in Spitzberg’s typology details. Note that 
online tools provide excellent capabilities for indirect harassment of a victim. For 
example, the placement of a false profile on a social networking site with the victim’s 
contact information can lead to a deluge of messages directed at the victim. On its face, 
this shows the flexibility that online techniques can have in supporting harassment and 
stalking activities.  
Note here that online technologies are tools not strategies, and can be used to 
support harassment acts that fall into any of the first five of Spitzberg’s strategies as 
listed in Table 2.  
32
Online Methods Used by Cyberstalkers 
A number of authors have noted that cyberspace provides stalkers with new tools 
that allow them to stalk the victim anonymously and/or by proxy (D'Ovidio and Doyle 
2003; Bocij 2004; Aggarwal et al. 2005; Alexy et al. 2005; Beran and Qing 2005). In one 
early study, Fisher, Cullen et al. (2000) found that email was used in 25% of traditional 
stalking incidents identified in a randomly selected national survey of 4,446 women who 
were attending a 2- or 4-year college or university during the Fall of 1996.  
A search of the literature found only two studies that attempted to determine the 
prevalence of particular online tools. Using data from the New York Police Department 
Computer Investigation & Technology Unit (CITU), one study found that email was the 
most common technology, used in 79% of cases, with instant messaging (IM) following 
in 13% of cases. Other methods used included chat groups (8%), message boards (4%), 
web sites (2%), with news groups and fake profiles appearing in only 1% of cases 
(D'Ovidio and Doyle 2003). 92% of cases used only one CMC method. The D'Ovidio and 
Doyle study, based on police records, is unable to report on incidents not reported to law 
enforcement, and thus leaves a significant gap in the research. Researchers in the second 
study found that 16.2% of students on a college campus had received harassing emails, 
19.3% had received harassing IM messages, and 14.1% reported that the email 
harassment did not stop when requested. Similarly, 13.1% reported that the IM 
harassment did not stop when requested (Finn 2004). Most students in this survey did not 
report using chat, news groups, or other online technologies. Given the limited research 
into methods used by cyberstalkers, especially outside of the campus environment, this 
calls for further exploration of harassment methods in the CMC environment.  
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Case Severity in Cyberstalking 
The best measure of the severity of a stalking case is the psychological impact on 
the victim (Goldberg et al. 1997; Purcell et al. 2004). Data for this is not readily available 
without an extensive data collection process, so a proxy for this measure is required. 
Purcell et al. (2004) show a significant connection between the frequency and number of 
harassing acts, threats, and aggression and the resulting psychological impact on the 
victim. Purcell and colleagues showed that stalking cases lasting longer than two weeks 
had elevated measures of psychological morbidity and were more severe in all categories 
than stalking cases lasting less than two weeks. Their measures were the 28-item General 
Health Questionnaire (Goldberg and Hillier 1979), a screening measure of current general 
psychiatric morbidity, and the Impact of Event Scale (Horowitz et al. 1979), a measure of 
post-traumatic stress reactions associated with victimization. Further comparison of both 
morbidity measures between short cases and non-stalking survey respondents were not 
significantly different (Purcell et al. 2004). This leads to the conclusion that increases in 
duration, action frequency, threat volume, and aggression can be associated with 
increases in psychological impacts on the victims. This research activity utilizes Purcell’s 
conclusions to develop an index of case severity, which is based on the presence (or not) 
of various actions and threats in the case record, and which is used as a proxy for 
measures of psychological morbidity. The details of this approach are provided in 
Chapter IV.  
Because stalking (and cyberstalking) are made up of many smaller actions, there 
has been an ongoing debate in the legal and practitioner communities about what 
constitutes the crime of stalking, and this is reflected in the research literature (see, for 
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example, Dziegielewski and Roberts 1995; Goode 1995; Ellison and Akdeniz 1998; 
Tjaden and Thoennes 1998; Sheridan et al. 2001b; Sheridan et al. 2002; Brenner 2004; 
Phillips et al. 2004; Roberts and Dziegielewski 2006). Each of these papers attempts to 
answer the question of whether particular types of incidents are serious enough to be 
labeled a crime. Unfortunately, these works assume a binary outcome, crime or not, and 
do not measure or propose measures of the degree of impact on the victim.  
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CHAPTER III  
RESEARCH MODEL & HYPOTHESIS 
Research Model 
The formal research model explored in this paper is shown below in Figure 2, and 
consists of two main elements. The first element addresses the interaction of the type and 
intensity of the prior relationship between the stalker and the victim, and the context in 
which the relationship existed, where the latter is divided into online and offline 
relationships. This interaction is the subject of the first hypothesis under study (H1 in 
Figure 2), and underlies all of the following work. A series of additional hypotheses 
extend the analysis of this interaction to look into postulated differences related to 
intimacy level (H2) and anonymity (H4) on the part of the stalker. The second element 
attempts to explore a trio of the various characteristics of computer mediated 
communications that may have an impact on cyberstalking. This trio of characteristics 
includes media channel richness (H5), interactivity (H6), and distribution (H7), as 
identified by Te'eni (2001) and modified for use in this activity as described below. This 
effort thus begins the task of pulling apart CMC characteristics to see which has the most 
significant impacts on this type of relationship. This cyberstalking severity model and 
each of its specific constructs are described in greater detail in the following sections.  
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Figure 2: Cyberstalking Severity Model 
Relationship Intimacy and Context 
A relationship’s intimacy level and the context in which it began are clearly 
related (Emerson et al. 1998). However, this effect changes the longer the relationship 
lasts, since the experience gained will eventually dominate the nature of the relationship 
(McKenna et al. 2002). Thus, there is the likelihood for interaction between these two 
constructs and this interaction should also affect the relationship after it becomes 
disjunctive. This is supported with the study by Thompson and Nadler (2002) that 
showed that adversarial negotiations were hindered by exclusive use of CMC channels, 
implying that the use of CMC channels will affect at least some types of disjunctive 
relationships. Further, because the nature of the prior relationship is known to have an 
effect on stalking case severity (Emerson et al. 1998; Thompson and Nadler 2002; 
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Cupach and Spitzberg 2004; Hian et al. 2004), an analysis must begin by looking at the 
interaction between the intimacy level of the relationship and the context in which the 
relationship began. In this case, it requires differentiating between relationships that 
began or exist totally online versus those that merely include online elements. This 
suggests that differences in case severity will be noted when online and offline cases of 
stalking are compared.  
While arguments can be made for either an increase or a decrease in case severity 
resulting from use of CMC channels, it appears that on balance, a decrease is more likely. 
The argument for an increase is based on extending the work of Bargh, McKenna, and 
colleagues (Bargh 2002; Bargh et al. 2002; McKenna et al. 2002), which suggest that 
CMC usage accelerates the relationship cycle, along with the findings of Thompson and 
Nadler (2002), which suggests that CMC usage amplifies adversarial effects in a 
relationship. Conversely, purely online relationships tend to move offline as they 
strengthen (Emerson et al. 1998; McKenna et al. 2002), suggesting that the stronger the 
relationship, the less likely it is to remain a purely online relationship. There is definitely 
a one-way flow from online to offline for the strongest relationships. The reverse is likely 
uncommon, but possible, for friends and acquaintances, based on observation and casual 
conversations with friends and colleagues. Assuming that stronger relationships lead to 
more severe cases of stalking, online relationships that move offline will tend to bias 
central tendency measures of severity, lowering values for online cases and raising it for 
offline cases. Unless this potential confound can be measured and accounted for, it is 
possible it will dominate any CMC effects in the other direction.  
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Two simple steps can be taken to reduce (but not eliminate) this problem when 
working with field data. First, offline cases where the stalker is identified as a former 
spouse can be eliminated, as it would be extremely unusual for couples to marry without 
meeting offline. This eliminates many offline cases with the strongest relationships, 
relationships that can be assumed not to have an online corollary. Second, any 
measurement of case severity must include the presence of physical aggression and 
violence in the case. Such actions are not possible online, but should account for a 
portion of any reasonable measure of case severity. Thus, this study also excludes offline 
cases that include occurrences of physical aggression and violence from the offline 
comparison group.  
Measurement and testing confounds aside, the following set of four hypothesis is 
proposed to capture the interaction between the relationship intimacy level and its online 
or offline context.  
H1: The difference in severity levels between online and offline cases are 
positively related to the level of relationship intimacy.  
H1A: Case severity levels associated with offline intimate relationships will be 
more severe than online intimate relationships.  
H1B: Case severity levels associated with offline relationships with friends and 
acquaintances will NOT be different from online relationships with friends 
and acquaintances.  
H1C: Case severity levels associated with offline relationships with strangers 
will be different than online relationships with strangers.  
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Bargh notes that online effects associated with social activity “depend on how the unique 
qualities of Internet communication modes interact with the particular characteristics and 
goals of the individuals, groups, and communities using them” (Bargh 2002 p1). These 
hypothesis assert that the same holds true for disjunctive relationships. The secondary 
hypotheses H1A, H1B, and H1C are based on different levels of experience in the 
relationship prior to the onset of the harassment. These hypotheses assume that as the 
level of intimacy increases, the importance of the communications process changes. 
Intimates will have taken efforts to explore the personality and interests of their 
partner, but online intimates relationships are not likely to have experienced the quantity 
of time together as offline intimate relationships, leading to less severe cases for online 
intimate relationships. This leads directly to hypothesis H1A. Hypothesis H1A is, as 
noted above, also likely to be affected by the one-way flow of relationships from online 
to offline as intimacy increases, and case severity will thus reflect the increased 
familiarity that offline relationships have over online relationships.  
Friendships are based on shared common interests, and acquaintances on shared 
common goals (Lewis 1960). Neither common interests nor common goals expand 
experience in the same manner as does intimacy, thus leading to lower levels of severity 
for cyberstalking cases originating out of friendships and acquaintances, when compared 
to intimate relationships. Further, there is nothing obvious suggesting that shared goals 
accomplished online differ from similar goals accomplished offline in their impact on 
relationships. If that is true, than it holds that when such relationships turn disjunctive, 
the resulting severity levels should be similar, leading to hypothesis H1B.  
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Strangers do not share anything at the onset of the relationship, and will thus have 
little knowledge on which to base their harassment actions. Further, there is little in the 
literature suggesting that stalking and harassment by strangers differs from that by 
stalkers known to the victim (Sheridan et al. 2001b; Spitzberg 2002; Spitzberg and 
Hoobler 2002). Thus, it is difficult to predict the relative levels of case severity between 
online and offline stalking by strangers, and this project will predict a difference as 
provided for in H1C, but will not specify a direction at this time.  
Figure 3 illustrates the predicted outcome of a test of hypotheses H1, H1A, H1B, 
and H1C, where hypothesis H1 is represented by the differing slopes of the lines shown.  
Figure 3: Predicted Results for the Relationship × Context Interaction  
 
Main Effects: Intimacy Level
One of the more reliable findings about stalking is that the level of prior intimacy 
between the partners is a good predictor of violence (Cupach and Spitzberg 2004 p135, 
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summarizing 14 other works). Former intimates are much more likely than any others to 
employ aggression against their victim, with a consequent increase in the severity of the 
case. Purcell et al. (2004) showed that differences based on duration were correlated with 
the type of relationship, with longer cases associated with stronger psychological effects 
and greater intimacy. Taking a different perspective, the following hypothesis ignores the 
time domain and looks only at the reported level of intimacy and its effect on case 
severity.  
H2: Former relationship intimacy level is positively associated with severity.  
Main Effects: Context
The interaction between the intensity of a relationship and its use of CMC 
channels is discussed above. It is also apparent that there may be significant main effects 
both on relationships generally and differently on various types of relationships. These 
flow directly from the finding of Bargh, McKenna, and colleagues (Bargh 2002; Bargh et 
al. 2002; McKenna et al. 2002) and others (Kraut et al. 2002; Spears et al. 2002; 
Thompson and Nadler 2002; Tyler 2002) showing that Internet usage can have both 
positive and negative effects. Hypothesis H3 tests this generally. The direction is 
expected to show that offline relationships will be more severe, due to the effects of 
intimate relationships which are both generally more severe and more likely offline.  
H3: Offline relationships will be more severe than online relationships.  
Main Effects: Anonymity
Anonymity as used here is a special case within the broader spectrum of types of 
relationships, as noted in Chapter II. Not knowing the identity of a stalker is likely to 
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increase the level of fear in the victim. Further, anonymity removes the potential of 
negative consequences for the stalker, provided the anonymity can be maintained 
(Connolly et al. 1990). Given the effective ability of CMC to hide true identities 
(Berthold et al. 2000), a desire for anonymity on the part of a stalker is likely to influence 
both their choice of communications media, and the impact on the victim. Further, the 
more an anonymous stalker knows about a victim, the more severe the impact is likely to 
be. Such would be the case if a former intimate successfully stalks a victim anonymously. 
Thus, since CMC tools can provide effective anonymity, the impact on a case should be 
to increase severity. This leads to the following hypothesis:  
H4: Anonymity is positively associated with case severity.  
CMC Channel Characteristics 
Presuming that the previous postulates hold, a logical follow-up question is what 
characteristic of CMC tools have the largest impact on the link between CMC usage and 
case severity. As shown in Table 1 and discussed in Chapter II, three characteristics of 
CMC media appear likely to have an impact on the outcome of a communications 
message (Te'eni 2001). These include the media’s richness, its interactivity, and its 
distribution characteristics. 
• Media channel richness addresses the capacity of the media to support more 
or less detail related to non-verbal cues and hints that a perceptive reader can 
use to interpret the message content (Te'eni 2001 p271; Kock 2004). In this 
research, the media used by cyberstalkers have been divided into media that 
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can support verbal communications, and those that only support textual 
messages.  
• Media channel interactivity relates to the ability of the channel to support 
real time dialog between the parties (Te'eni 2001), and each media type is 
characterized as either real time or delayed.  
• Media channel distribution is a proxy for Te’eni’s (2001) adaptiveness, 
which is the ability of a medium to tailor a message for a given recipient. 
Media distribution is characterized as either public or private, depending on 
the level of control that the sender exercises over who receives the message.  
This leads to three very straight-forward hypotheses about the impacts of richness, 
interactivity, and distribution mechanism on cyberstalking case severity, as presented 
below.  
Media Channel Richness
Hypothesis H5 tests the impacts of the richness of media channels on 
communications within a disjunctive relationship, by comparing cases that use media 
supporting verbal communications with those that use only media supporting text. This 
follows from Kock (2004), who suggests that support for voice is the most important 
division with respect to media channel richness. To test this, each media type is 
characterized as either verbal or textual, and cases are categorized by their media usage 
information. Figure 4 illustrates the predicted impact of this richness construct on 
stalking case severity. 
H5: Cases using verbal media will be more severe than cases using only text 
media.  
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Figure 4: Predicted Impact of Richness on Case Severity  
 
Media Channel Interactivity
As noted in Chapter II, the interactivity of a channel relates to its support for 
immediate feedback from the receiver (Te'eni 2001). Te’eni suggests that better 
interactivity assists in activities that are highly dynamic, and is necessary when the 
speaker must adapt the communications on the fly in response to feedback from the 
receiver. In disjunctive relationships, the evidence suggests that such feedback is neither 
required in every situation that leads to increases in case severity (Miller 1999a; Sheridan 
et al. 2001a) nor is it necessary for more severe acts of harassment (Spitzberg 2002). This 
leads to a balance of alternatives, making a specific prediction problematic. Thus, while 
hypothesis H6 suggests that interactivity does have an impact on case severity, it should 
come as no surprise if there are no differences between the types of media are found. To 
test this, each media type is characterized as either real time or delayed, and cases are 
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categorized by their medial usage information. Figure 5 illustrates the predicted impact of 
this interactivity construct on stalking case severity.  
H6: Cases using real time media will be more severe than cases using only 
delayed media.  
Figure 5: Predicted Impact of Interactivity on Case Severity 
 
Media Channel Distribution
As noted in Chapter II, distribution reflects the ability of the sender to direct a 
message to a controlled list of recipients, and is a proxy for Te’eni’s (2001) adaptability 
construct addressing the ability of the sender to customize or adapt a message to a 
particular recipient. To test this, each media type is characterized as either public or 
private, and cases are categorized by their media usage information. In developing a 
specific hypothesis for disjunctive relationships, note that some harassing activities (e.g. 
slander and other forms of reputational harassment) are more effective in public media, 
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while others are better suited to private media. As for the interactivity construct, this 
suggests a potential confound and leads to a balance of alternatives, making a specific 
prediction problematic. Hypothesis H7 tests the proposition that the distribution 
mechanism will affect case severity, with the stipulation that there is insufficient prior 
evidence to suggest that a difference between pubic and private media will be found. 
Figure 6 illustrates the predicted impact of this distribution construct on stalking case 
severity. 
H7: Cases using private media will be more severe than cases using only 
public media.  
Figure 6: Predicted Impact of Distribution on Case Severity 
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Chapter Summary 
This chapter proposes a research model to explore disjunctive stalking 
relationships within the confines of online computer mediated communications and 
offline communications. It also examines disjunctive relationships that exist only in an 
online context and offline relationships that use online communications tools. To 
accomplish this, three hypotheses are developed to test for differences in case severities 
and identify the most important elements of this combination of online tools and 
relationships. A follow up hypothesis explores whether anonymity has an impact on the 
severity of cyberstalking case. Finally, three possible impacts that the use of CMC media 
may have on the severity of cyberstalking cases are explored, and hypotheses that test for 
the presence of these impacts are identified.  
48
CHAPTER IV  
METHODOLOGY & ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
This chapter presents information about the data used for this study and how it 
was transformed before the analysis. Implementation of three independent variables 
representing the characteristics of the media channels used is described here, as are the 
implementation of variables for relationship intimacy, context and anonymity of the 
harasser. Core to this research is the development of the dependant variable, 
cyberstalking case severity, which is derived from field data with the help of the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty 1994). As was noted in Chapter II, the case severity 
value developed here is necessarily a proxy for the true, psychological, impact of the 
stalking and harassment actions (Goldberg et al. 1997; Purcell et al. 2004), since the data 
available does not contain the relevant information. This is followed with a description of 
the statistical techniques used, along with a necessary correction to the dependant 
variable that transforms it into a normal distribution.  
Data Source & Description 
A victim’s advocacy group, Working to Halt Online Abuse (WHOA), generously 
provide their cyberstalking case records for this project’s use. WHOA regularly works 
with victims referred by law enforcement agencies otherwise unable to meet the victim’s 
needs, and in turn refers victims to appropriate law enforcement agencies when a case is 
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sufficiently serious. WHOA provided 1225 case records summarizing cyberstalking 
incidents over the time period from 2001 to 2005. After the data was recoded (see next 
paragraph for the details), seventy-five cases were deemed not harassment (most were 
spam problems), and were dropped from the data. This left 1150 harassment cases for 
subsequent analysis. All data is self-reported by the victims, as recorded and summarized 
by WHOA’s volunteer advocates (case workers). Case results are noted by the advocate, 
but cannot be verified. However, victims seeking help have greater incentive to provide 
accurate information.  
Raw WHOA data was recoded into a form suitable for statistical analysis, then 
assigned a calculated index of apparent severity, as described below. Due to the large 
number of cases and items per case in this data set, one individual coded the entire data 
set. As a check on this process, three graduate students not otherwise associated with the 
project were recruited and each was asked to code a different random sample of 100 
cases as a check of the coding process. Each was provided with written instructions 
(included as Appendix A) and a brief training session. Inter-rater reliability scores were 
calculated for the combination of all four coders ( = 0.947), and for each test coder 
separately against the primary coder’s version (’s of 0.940, 0.950, and 0.809). The 
primary coder’s version was used for all subsequent analysis.  
WHOA case data captures the communications media used for the first harassing 
message, other media used, other places the victim reported the harassment (e.g. law 
enforcement), a summary of the case results, and the year of occurrence. Each case 
contains some demographic information on the victim’s age, gender, marital status, race, 
and state or country of residence. This information is summarized in Table 3. In addition, 
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each case contains some information about the stalker, where known to the victim, 
including age, gender, and state or country of residence. This project cannot address 
relative severity by sexual orientation, since WHOA data ignores this factor. This 
prohibits a direct one-to-one comparison with the study by Finn (2004).  
Table 3: WHOA Data Demographic Information 
Victim Stalker  Victim 
Age Range  N % N % Marital Status* N %
Unknown 91 7.9% 849 73.8% Unknown 115 10.0%
Under 18 5 0.4% 9 0.8% Single 483 42.0%
18-30 549 47.7% 101 8.8% Married 351 30.5%
31-40 311 27.0% 82 7.1% Separated 27 2.3%
41+ 194 16.9% 70 6.1% Divorced 113 9.8%
Multiple 0 0.0% 39 3.4% Life Partner 52 4.5%
Total 1150 1150 Widow 9 0.8%
Total 1150
Gender Race* 
Unknown 33 2.9% 170 14.8% Unknown 107 9.3%
Female 857 74.5% 331 28.8% African American 44 3.8%
Male 260 22.6% 606 52.7% Asian 40 3.5%
Multiple 0 0.0% 43 3.7% Caucasian 837 72.8%
Total 1150 1150 Hispanic 47 4.1%
Native American 22 1.9%
Other 53 4.6%
Total 1150
*WHOA does not collect marital status or race information about harassers.  
Unfortunately, WHOA advocates added variance to the data. Cases are distributed 
to advocates based on workload and availability. WHOA reports that distribution of cases 
is not based on difficulty or advocate skill set, though some appear to handle mostly 
international cases. In practice, some advocates provided much more detail than others in 
their summaries, and the data summarized changed slightly over the five years2. Thus, for 
example, 557 cases did not have sufficient information in the summary to capture any of 
the stalker activities used for  the estimate of severity, leading to activity factor scores of 
0.00 (see the next section for the method used to calculate this value). Another 343 cases 
 
2 This affected the prior relationship data most: in 2001 this was reported as yes/no, and then evolved in 
2002 to include the type, e.g. ex intimate, family member, coworker, employer, fellow student, etc. 
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reported only the presence of one or more unspecified threats. It is also highly likely that 
not all activities relevant to the severity were recorded in the remaining cases, leading to 
underestimation of the severity of most cases in the data. An even 100 cases had 
composite severity scores of 0.00, and yet were deemed harassment by WHOA’s 
advocates. Univariate ANOVA was used to test the data for severity differences by 
advocate, and found two (of 20) outlier advocates representing 9 (0.8%) of the cases, one 
with a low mean severity score (2 cases), and one with a high mean score (7 cases). A 
post hoc test using Tukey’s HSD method grouped the remaining 17 advocates together 
with a significance level of 0.101. One advocate contributed only one case, and was 
excluded from this analysis. Given the relatively large number of “insufficient data for 
activity classification” scores, the indicated differences with the outlier advocates were 
discounted, and the analysis proceeded.  
The Independent Variables 
The model presented above includes six independent variables. Three are derived 
from information about the computer mediated communications media used by the 
harasser to communicate with the victim. These include the richness of the media in 
terms of its ability to support voice or text communications, the interactivity of the media, 
or its ability to support real time bi-directional communications, and the distribution 
mechanism for the media, specifically if it is private peer-to-peer or a posted public 
media. The second three are related to the nature of the relationship between the stalker 
and the victim. These include the degree of intimacy between the parties, the context in 
which the relationship exists (online or offline), and if the harasser is acting (or 
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attempting to act) anonymously. The methods used to operationalize each of these six 
variables are described in the following paragraphs.  
Media Channel Characteristics
The WHOA data identified 30 distinct ways harassers used CMC media to attack 
their victims. The data as coded included both the first media used by the harasser, and all 
media mentioned for use in this analysis. Table 4 shows the common forms of 
communications media used by stalkers in the WHOA data, along with the number of 
times they appeared in the data, both initially and overall. Also included were offline 
harassment techniques mentioned (most cases did not have any details) as one category, 
since they can be used as a proxy for face-to-face (F2F) communications generally. 
Table 5 lists the other, mostly indirect, harassment techniques identified in the data, each 
with the number of cases mentioning that media or technique. These are included in the 
“Other” media type in Table 4.  
Table 4: Common Media Types and their Characteristic Classifications 
Media Type 
Initial 
Use n % Richness Interactivity Distribution 
Email 423 647 56.3% Text Delayed Private 
Phone 27 170 14.8% Verbal Real Time Private 
IM 151 293 25.5% Text Real Time Private 
Chat 106 148 12.9% Text Real Time Public 
Blog 16 32 2.8% Text Delayed Public 
List Groups 29 49 4.3% Text Delayed Public 
Website 87 170 14.8% Text Delayed Public 
Message Boards 166 220 19.1% Text Delayed Public 
Usenet 25 34 3.0% Text Delayed Public 
Offline 42 96 8.3% Verbal Real Time Private 
Post 4 50 4.3% Text Delayed Private 
Hacking 9 43 3.7% Text Delayed Private 
Ebay* 35 44 3.8% Text Delayed Public 
Game Forums 15 19 1.7% Text Real Time Public 
Other 15 37 3.2%    
*"Ebay" represents ratings of buyers and sellers in online auctions and other forms of person-to-person 
transactions generally.  
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Table 5: Other Online Harassment Techniques 
Harassment Type 
Initial 
Use n Richness* Interactivity* Distribution* 
Delivered Gifts 0 1 Other Other Private 
Ecards 2 4 Text Delayed Private 
False Reports 0 1 Other Delayed Private 
FAX 0 3 Text Delayed Private 
Identity Research 0 1 Other Delayed Private 
Impersonation 1 1 Other Delayed Other 
Online Class 0 1 Verbal Real Time Public 
Paging 1 1 Text Delayed Private 
Photos Posted 0 2 Text Delayed Public 
Radio 0 1 Verbal Real Time Public 
Spyware 1 1 Text Delayed Private 
Texting 0 8 Text Delayed Private 
Unwanted 
Subscriptions 1 2 Other Delayed Private 
Webcam 0 2 Verbal Real Time Private 
Webring 1 1 Text Delayed Public 
Wikipedia 0 2 Text Delayed Public 
Unknown 8 5**    
*In these columns, “Other” characterizations were not used when classifying a case.  
**There were 5 cases that did not mention any media at all, and were excluded from the media 
impact analysis.  
To complete the analysis, all 30 harassment types found in the data were 
characterized in three ways to align with those suggested in Chapter II and III above: 1) 
by their richness, 2) by their interactivity, or 3) and by their distribution characteristics. 
This is shown in the last three columns of Tables 4 and 5 above. Since each case could, 
and often did, use multiple media, the cases were assigned to a “mixed” classification if 
the case combined media that differed in characterization in that category. Thus, if a case 
included both email and phone as coded, then the case classification would be “mixed” 
richness, “mixed” interactivity, and “private” distribution. Table 6 summarizes the 
number of cases in each classification.  
Table 6: Media Classification Summary 
Richness Interactivity Distribution 
Text 901 Delayed 584 Private 512 
Verbal 20 Real Time 199 Public 266 
Mixed 224 Mixed 362 Mixed 367 
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The analysis reported in Chapter V excludes 100 cases involving former spouses, family 
members, serious aggression, cases that began online then moved offline before the 
harassment began, and 5 cases that did not provide information on the media used by the 
harasser. The reasons for these exclusions are explained in the next section.  
Prior Relationship Level of Intimacy and Context
The most important  independent variable in this project’s working model is the 
victim-perpetrator relationship, which is expected to control for the traditional view 
(Sheridan et al. 2001a) that the presence of a strong relationship increases the severity of 
the case. Therefore, the cases were categorized by prior relationship, using and extending 
the categories provided by Sheridan et al. (2001a). Prior relationships and the context 
where the relationship existed are clearly related. Cyberstalking implies an online 
component, and there are many cases of purely online stalking. To capture this element, 
each case was coded as purely online, originally an offline relationship, or relationship 
context unknown. In addition, four cases were identified in the original data as having 
originated online, but moved offline prior to the onset of harassment. Due to the small 
number of such cases, they were excluded from the analysis.  
The WHOA data provides excellent information about prior relationships between 
the victim and stalker for the years 2002-2005. In 2001, WHOA recorded the existence of 
a relationship, but not its nature. The WHOA data was coded into 7 categories as shown 
in column 2 of Table 7. Column 1 maps the WHOA categories into the categories defined 
by Sheridan et al. (2001a) for prior relationships, specifically former intimate/spouse, 
acquaintance, stranger, unknown, plus one category suggested by Roberts and 
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Dziegielewski (2006), other family member. Table 7 also shows the breakdown of each 
category by the context of the case.  
Table 7: Prior Relationship Categories 
Sheridan 
Category WHOA Relationship 
Purely 
Online 
Originally 
Offline 
Context 
Unknown 
Intimate/Spouse Spouse 0 56 0 
Intimate** 49 95 21 
Acquaintance Friend 23 36 10 
 Acquaintance 178 159 13 
Other Family Family 0 15 0 
Stranger Stranger/None 266 7 15 
Unknown Unknown 81* 8* 114* 
 *Unknown in 2001: 22 5 47 
*74 of these 203 were in 2001, when WHOA did not generally record the nature of the 
relationship. There were a total of 249 cases recorded in 2001.  
**Excludes 4 cases that began online and moved offline before the harassment began.  
 
Because the two categories “Spouse” and “Family” did not have any online or 
unknown relationships, they were excluded from further analysis. In addition, there were 
20 cases that identified significant acts of aggression. As this can only occur offline, these 
cases were excluded as well. Four intimate cases were excluded because the case record 
showed that the relationship began online and moved offline before the harassment 
began. The small number of such cases does not allow a meaningful statistical analysis to 
be preformed on these cases. Finally, all cases where either the prior relationship or the 
context were coded as “unknown” were dropped, leaving 789 valid and complete cases.  
Anonymity of the Harasser
Each case was coded as anonymous (n = 277), not anonymous (n = 649), or 
unknown (n = 179). This was not derived solely from Table 7 data on relationships, but 
also from other evidence in the case summary. The anonymity analysis below excludes 
the cases marked as anonymity unknown.  
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Case Severity – The Dependent Variable 
Researchers studying computer mediated communications generally measure the 
outcomes of their tasks using measures of either performance (Carlson and Zmud 1999) 
or perception (Daft and Lengel 1986), and tend to overlook alternative measures of task 
success, such as the emotional impact it can have on the recipient (Te'eni 2001). The true 
impact of stalking is the impact it has on the victim (Goldberg et al. 1997; Purcell et al. 
2004), which meets Te’eni’s requirements for the output of a communicative act (Te'eni 
2001). As noted above, there are few measures of incident severity related to stalking or 
cyberstalking in the literature. According to classic stalking research (Emerson et al. 
1998; Cupach and Spitzberg 2004; Purcell et al. 2004), an increase in the number and 
severity of stalking events translates into an increasing impact on the victim. Supporting 
this, Purcell et al. (2004) showed a connection between the frequency and number of 
harassing acts, threats, and aggression and the resulting psychological impact on the 
victim. This suggests that measures of duration, action frequency, threat volume, and 
aggression can act as proxies for measures of the psychological impacts of stalking on 
victims. Such an index of case severity is developed in this section, based on the 
categories of stalking activities and strategies developed by Spitzberg (2002) augmented 
with additional categories suggested by Sheridan et al. (2001b) and a preliminary review 
of the data recorded in the case summaries provided by WHOA. The resulting index of 
case severity corresponds to CAMOC’s communications message impact (Te'eni 2001), 
and is used as the dependent variable for this study.  
To develop the index of case severity, the WHOA case data was used to calculate 
three category scores, based on the actions taken by the stalker, any threats present in the 
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case summary, and on the results noted by the WHOA advocate. These category scores 
are weighted and summed to provide the overall case score. To implement the approach, 
each case is scored with a Boolean value showing the presence (or not) of each specific 
type of activity, threat, or result, respectively, within each category as described below. 
The index of case severity is then calculated as the sum of the products of the item 
weights times the item’s presence flag. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used to 
provide weights for each item within each category and for the category weights (Saaty 
and Vargas 2001; Taylor 2004). The details of each category and the specific actions 
included in each are described in the following subsections, along with details on the use 
of AHP in the calculation of the item weights. More information on AHP and how the 
weights were calculated is included in Appendix B.  
Harassing Activities
Spitzberg’s (2002) stalking typology, which lists a large number of harassing 
activities that have been identified by earlier researchers as symptoms of stalking, 
provides the basis for the activity component of the case severity index. This meta-
analysis groups the activities into seven broader categories with roughly increasing levels 
of severity. Spitzberg’s list include some of the less severe harassment activities that fit 
into the non-stalking categories identified by Sheridan and colleagues (Sheridan et al. 
2001b; Sheridan et al. 2002) in the intimidation and harassment category. Deferring to 
Sheridan and colleagues, since their analysis is based on a cluster analysis of responses to 
a targeted survey, such activities are included in a less severe “obnoxious” or “obscene 
actions” category. For completeness, Sheridan’s “non-stalking courtship” category was 
also added to Spitzberg’s list along with a category for cases with insufficient 
58
information for categorization. This provides a full range of traditional harassing and 
stalking behaviors, which is presented in Table 8, along with AHP-based weights which 
are explained below and in Appendix B.  
Table 8: Stalking and Harassment Activity Categories  
Activity Category 
Spitzberg 
Category* N
AHP 
Weight 
Aggression VII 23 0.316
Coercion and Constraint VI 1 0.273
Intimidation, Slander, & False Charges V 231 0.085
Hyper Intimacy I 52 0.078
Impersonation 69 0.060
Invasion, Theft, and Vandalism (excluding hacking)  III 87 0.049
Proxy Pursuit & Intrusion  IV 45 0.045
Pursuit, Proximity, Surveillance II 69 0.036
Obnoxious or Obscene Actions 551 0.023
Courtship behavior 35 0.022
Hacking, Trojans, Spyware, and Targeted Viruses 60 0.013
Insufficient data for activity classification 557 0.000
*See Table 2 for full definitions of Spitzberg’s categories.  
 
The WHOA data, being field data related to online harassment, included cases 
that did not easily fit into any category identified by Spitzberg or Sheridan and colleagues 
(Sheridan et al. 2001b; Sheridan et al. 2002; Spitzberg 2002) and that were specifically 
online in nature. These included impersonation of the victim by the stalker, and the uses 
of information technology to vandalize or otherwise harass the victim, or “hacking”. For 
example, a computer virus can be used to simply damage a victim’s computer, or can be 
used to place Trojan horse software, allowing access to passwords or track online 
activity. Information thus gleaned by the harasser can be used for theft of information, 
access to online accounts, and impersonation, intimidation or slander. Since it is not 
obvious where these online activities belong within the categories from earlier research, 
two additional categories are included in Table 8 to capture cases that mentioned these 
activities.  
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Each case is scored with a 1 to identify the presence of one or more activities in a 
category, or as a 0 in each category if there were no activities in that category in that case. 
Thus, cases can show activity in multiple categories, but do not show the relative level of 
activity within a category, since this is not captured or recorded by WHOA. These are 
used to generate the activity factor for the case. To generate the activity factor score, the 
coded value for each category is multiplied by the AHP weight for that category, and 
summed to give a factor score between 0 and 1.  
Threats
WHOA specifically asks victims about threats, and their case summary data 
includes a large number of cases where threats are present. This is used to develop a 
second severity factor, the threat factor. Spitzberg’s Intimidation and Harassment 
category includes a variety of threat types that were found in 419 of the 1150 (36.4%) 
harassment cases. To better analyze this data, the threat information is separated into five 
threat categories, shown in Table 9, based on the types of threats mentioned in 
Spitzberg’s meta-analysis (2002) and included in his intimidation and harassment 
category.  
Similar to the activity factor, the presence of a threat in the case was recorded as a 
1 in the category and as 0 otherwise. To generate the threat factor score, the coded value 
for each category is multiplied by the AHP weight, and summed to give a factor score 
between 0 and 1.  
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Table 9: Threat Categories   
Threat Category N AHP Weight
Death threats & threats of injury to victim 66 0.411
Threats to friends, family, or pets 8 0.358
Other threats and all unspecified threats 343 0.136
Threats to release personal information 44 0.054
Threats to property 10 0.042
Case Results
In the case summaries, WHOA advocates capture a brief statement of the results 
of their part of the case. In many cases, this is not the totality of the activity on the part of 
the greater team supporting the victim. A majority of cases, however, had sufficient 
information to develop a severity factor based on these comments. Note that this can be 
considered a lower bound on the resulting impact, as WHOA may not have known about 
or recorded more severe events in any given case. The result data was classified into one 
of 33 main result types. Because 33 types are too many to achieve reasonable results with 
the AHP process, similar result codes were combined, ending with 13 result categories, 
with the corresponding AHP weight used as the result factor score for the case, as listed 
in Table 10. Note that the last two categories in Table 10 are null categories with respect 
to their impact on the factor score.  
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Table 10: Result Categories   
Result Category N AHP Weight
Criminal charges pending 24 0.338
Restraining order requested or issued 43 0.219
Referred to law enforcement agency, under continuing 
investigation  
160 0.144
Referred to an attorney 36 0.094
Harasser banned by service provider (SP) or blocked by 
victim 
74 0.057
Reported to SP for action under terms of service 163 0.042
Other (diverse) results 3 0.042
Changed online identity 245 0.024
Victim stopped using service 98 0.017
Offending material or website removed 19 0.013
Ended or victim ignoring harassment 56 0.010
Victim ignored WHOA advice or is harassing harasser 46 0.000
Unresolved or unknown as victim failed to respond to 
follow-up process 
183 0.000
AHP Severity Factor Weights
The Analytic Hierarchy Process was developed by Saaty and Vargas (Saaty 1994; 
Saaty and Vargas 2001) and presented in a form suitable for calculation using 
spreadsheets by Taylor (2004). AHP uses pair-wise comparisons of alternatives by a 
subject matter expert to develop a preference (severity) vector for each criterion factor 
and factor category item (Saaty and Vargas 2001). The output can be thought of as the 
distance between the items on a linear scale, with an overall range of 0 to 1. In this case, 
Taylor’s (2004 p372) method was used to get weights for three main factors: activities, 
threats, and results that have been coded from the data. More detail on how this process 
was implemented can be found in Appendix B. These weights are presented in Table 11. 
Then for each main factor, the process was repeated on the component fields for that 
factor, resulting in the AHP weights given in Tables 8-10.  
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Table 11: Factor Weights 
Severity Factor AHP Weight
Activities 0.623
Threats 0.239
Results 0.137
The weights in Table 8 and Table 9 were derived using inputs provided by 
surveying a small number of professionals currently working in the domestic violence 
field, and asking them to estimate the difference in severity between pairs of activities, 
and pairs of threats. The trio of respondents included an investigative detective from a 
large metropolitan police force specializing in stalking and domestic abuse cases, and two 
members of a coordinating council on domestic violence serving the same metropolitan 
area. The questionnaire used for this process is provided in Appendix C. Inter-rater 
reliability for the three respondents was  = 0.820. The results of this survey were 
averaged item by item per Saaty (1994) and input into AHP to develop the category 
weights given above. Note that our trio of experts did not agree with the activity severity 
ordering suggested by Spitzberg (2002) and shown in Table 8. The result weights derived 
in Table 10 and the factor weights in Table 11 used AHP inputs generated by this 
researcher in consultation with WHOA.  
Statistical Methods 
ANOVA is the statistical analysis method of choice when the independent 
variables are categorical and the dependant variable is scalar (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 
1991; Hair et al. 1998; Freund and Wilson 2003). While regression provides the same 
results, it is more difficult to code categorical data for regression, due to the requirement 
that categorical data be dummy coded. Additionally, ANOVA cleanly and clearly isolates 
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interaction terms and results in factorial designs where the results sought are likely to 
show the existence of complex interactions. Thus the bulk of the analysis in this project 
utilized ANOVA methods.  
Use of ANOVA requires that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal 
across groups (Hair et al. 1998; Freund and Wilson 2003). Since the nature of 
cyberstalking case severity is such that mathematically it appears exponential, our data 
violates this assumption. The solution to this problem is straight-forward: transform the 
dependant variable in such a manner that it approaches a normal distribution. The AHP 
process results in a severity index value that is between zero and one, with the bulk of the 
values at the lower end of this range. Only 17 cases in this data set of 1150 cases have a 
severity index greater than 0.4. The most appropriate transformation for this data set is to 
take the cube root of the index value, which was found to minimize the skewness for the 
transformed data. The impact of this transformation on the WHOA cyberstalking data is 
captured in Table 12 below. The transformed value was used in all testing of this data. 
Since the AHP severity index is a calculated index, using a transformation does not 
present any interpretation problems with respect to understanding the data under analysis 
in this situation (Hair et al. 1998).  
Table 12: Dependant Variable Transformation 
 Untransformed Transformed
Mean 0.0495 0.2960
Standard Deviation 0.0640 0.1617
Kurtosis 9.5997 -0.4132
Skewness 2.5482 0.0730
ANOVA has been used to study similar, non-random field data in a variety of 
disciplines. Roth and Morrison (1990) used ANOVA to analyze data from selected large 
enterprises to study the integration-responsiveness framework in global industries. 
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Lubatkin et al. (1997) used non-random samples to study the Universalist hypothesis of 
management work using data from managers in four countries selected for organization 
size and culture. Snodgrass et al. (2006) used MANOVA to analyze non-random, cross-
sectional data documenting the prevalence of obesity among indigenous populations.  
65
CHAPTER V  
RESULTS 
Following the logic presented above, this report must first present the results of 
the interaction between the relationship intimacy level and the context in which the 
relationship began and exists. Once these constructs are characterized, the analysis 
proceeds to the impacts of CMC media on the case severity, which is the focal point of 
this research project. The chapter concludes with a post hoc analysis of the impacts of 
specific media types (e.g. email) on case severity, and the relationship between gender 
and case severity.  
Relationship Context and its Effect on Cyberstalking Severity 
Relationship Intimacy by Context Results (H1)
Hypothesis H1 postulated an interaction between the relationship intimacy level 
and relationship context variables. The analysis used a 2 x 3 factorial design in an 
ANOVA framework to test for this interaction. The results showed a significant 
interaction term, as seen in Table 13, providing support for hypothesis H1. The six 
interaction cell means were compared using Bonferroni’s correction for multiple 
comparisons, and only the offline intimate cell was consistently different from the other 
cells. This is shown in Table 14, and the cell mean values are illustrated in Figure 7. Both 
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suggest that online cases are similar in severity to offline cases, except when the 
relationship is intimate.  
Table 13: Prior Relationship by Context Interaction Results 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Observed 
Power(a)
Intercept 15.800 1 15.800 722.093 0.000 1.000
Intimacy 0.197 2 0.098 4.493 0.011 0.768
Context 0.361 1 0.361 16.481 0.000 0.982
Intimacy * Context 0.144 2 0.072 3.279 0.038 0.623
Error 17.132 783 0.022
(a) Computed using alpha = 0.05. (b) R Squared = .061 (Adjusted R Squared = .055). 
 
Table 14: Planned Comparisons of Relationship by Context Cell Means 
Difference of Means 
Significance 
Offline 
Intimates
Offline 
Acquaint.
Offline 
Strangers
Online 
Intimates
Online 
Acquaint.
Online 
Strangers
Offline Intimates 0.069 -0.055 0.091 0.104 0.117
0.006 1.000 0.010 0.000 0.000
Offline Acquaint. -0.069 -0.123 0.022 0.035 0.049
0.006 0.993 1.000 0.299 0.010
Offline Strangers 0.055 0.123 0.145 0.159 0.172
1.000 0.993 0.550 0.271 0.153
Online Intimates -0.091 -0.022 -0.145 0.013 0.027
0.010 1.000 0.550 1.000 1.000
Online Acquaint. -0.104 -0.035 -0.159 -0.013 0.013
0.000 0.299 0.271 1.000 1.000
Online Strangers -0.117 -0.049 -0.172 -0.027 -0.013
0.000 0.010 0.153 1.000 1.000
Bold cells are significant at the 0.05 level. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
 
Hypothesis H1A postulated that offline intimate cases would be more severe than 
online intimate cases. This hypothesis is supported (p = 0.010), as shown in Table 14. In 
the intimate case, offline cases are more severe, likely due to the closer nature of the 
relationship and the feasibility of offline harassment activities.  
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Figure 7: Prior Relationship by Context Interaction Results 
 
Hypothesis H1B postulated that offline acquaintance cases would not be different 
from online acquaintance cases. This hypothesis is supported with this data (p = 0.299). 
Note that this test has excellent balance (offline n = 182, online n = 200) and a sufficient 
number of cases to provide a robust result. It is then possible to conclude that online only 
relationships at the acquaintance level are no different from their offline equivalent when 
disjunctive.  
Hypothesis H1C postulated that offline stranger cases would be different from 
online stranger cases. This hypothesis is not supported with this data (p = 0.153). Note 
that while the difference between the offline and online stranger means is the largest 
difference shown, this is not significant due to the very small number of cases in the 
offline stranger category (n = 5). With additional data, it is possible that this hypothesis 
could be supported, thus this result is insufficient for use in drawing any meaningful 
conclusions.  
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Relationship Intimacy and Context Main Effects (H2 & H3)
Hypothesis H2 postulated a difference in case severity based on the level of 
intimacy in the relationship. Accounting for relationship intimacy and relationship 
context interaction, the intimacy main effect term was significant (F(2, 783) = 4.493, p =
0.011, power at  = 0.05 is 0.768), as seen in Table 13. Thus the data supports hypothesis 
H2, and indicates that intimacy level is a factor within cyberstalking cases. This follow 
expectations as suggested by Spitzberg’s (2002) review of the stalking literature, and 
suggests that cyberstalking is not different from offline stalking it this area. Figure 8 
charts the mean severity levels actually measured, along with the relative levels predicted 
above.  
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Figure 8: Independent Effect of Prior Relationship  
 
Hypothesis H3 postulated that severity of offline cases would be more severe than 
those that were online. Accounting for relationship intimacy and relationship context 
interaction, the context main effect term is significant (F(1, 783) = 16.481, p < 0.001, power 
at  = 0.05 is 0.982), as seen in Table 13. This suggests that the online versus offline 
context of the relationship influences the severity of the case, and supports hypothesis 
H3. From this information we can tentatively conclude that while online disjunctive 
relationships are in most respects similar to those offline, an online context mitigates the 
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severity of a case, even after eliminating cases including offline aggression from the 
comparison. Figure 9 charts the mean severity levels actually measured, along with the 
relative levels predicted above.  
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Figure 9: Independent Effect of Context  
 
Given the concurrence of these analyses, it should be clear that context plays a 
significant role in the effects so far studied. Thus it is easy to conclude that the use of 
CMC tools dampens the effects of a harasser’s efforts, leading to lower levels of case 
severity.  
Anonymity Results (H4)
Hypothesis H4 addressed anonymity as a factor in case severity. To test this, a 2 x 
6 factorial design ANOVA was employed to contrast the anonymity variable described in 
Chapter IV with the cells of the combined relationship intimacy-context interaction 
described above. This test failed to show any significant interactions (F(4, 684) = 0.801, p =
0.525, power at  = 0.05 is 0.258). Anonymity as a main effect was not significant after 
accounting for relationship intimacy and context (F(1, 684) = 0.806, p = 0.369, power at  =
0.05 is 0.146), and a univariate test of anonymity was also not significant (F(1, 684) = 1.40, 
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p = 0.237, power at  = 0.05 is 0.219). Figure 10 charts the mean severity levels actually 
measured, along with the relative levels predicted above.  
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Figure 10: Independent Effect of Anonymity  
 
Thus the data from WHOA fails to support hypothesis H4, which suggested that 
anonymity has a role in cyberstalking case severity. From this it is clear that this data 
does not support the suggestion that anonymity affects case severity in any meaningful 
manner.  
Impacts of CMC Channel Characteristics on Cyberstalking Severity 
Turning to the focal point of this research activity, the impacts of CMC channel 
characteristics are analyzed next. In line with the research model outlined in Chapter III, 
channel richness is analyzed first, followed by channel interactivity, and then channel 
distribution.  
CMC Channel Richness (H5)
Hypothesis H5 posited that severity of cases using media supporting verbal 
communications would be more severe than cases using only media that support text 
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communications. Before looking at the main effects, the richness variable was tested 
against the combined prior relationship plus context variable established above to 
determine if the established effect of intimacy plus context affected the richness results. 
This interaction test failed to show a significant interaction term (F(8, 773) = 0.822, p =
0.583, power at  = 0.05 is 0.388), thus the analysis of the richness main effects term 
resumed. It showed that the richness construct provides a significant impact on case 
severity (F(2, 773) = 6.525, p = 0.002, power at  = 0.05 is 0.908), supporting the 
hypothesized effect. Figure 11 charts the mean severity levels actually measured, along 
with the relative levels predicted above.  
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Figure 11: Chart of Media Richness Mean Severity Levels 
 
Following up on this, the separate richness categories of verbal, text and mixed 
use cases are examined. Tukey’s HSD test was used to associate groups that were not 
dissimilar. This found that text only cases are separate from the other two, as shown in 
Table 15 below. 
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Table 15: Richness Severity Means Comparison 
Tukey HSD Subset 
Richness N 1 2
Text 644 0.275 
Verbal 10 0.386 
Mixed 135 0.388 
HSD Significance 1.000 0.998 
Based on Type III Sum of Squares. The error term is Mean Square 
(Error) = 0.021. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 27.533. The 
harmonic mean of the group sizes is used. Alpha = 0.05. 
 
Tests of the severity between classes within the richness variable showed a 
significant difference between text cases and mixed cases (mean difference 0.113, p <
0.001, using Bonferroni’s correction for multiple comparisons), as did the test for a 
difference between text and verbal cases (mean difference 0.111, p = 0.047). The 
comparison between verbal and mixed cases failed to show a significant difference of 
means (mean difference 0.002, p < 0.999). The mean severities were ordered, with text 
less than verbal, and verbal less than mixed. All the tests used for this analysis concurred 
in this comparison, providing support for hypothesis H5, suggesting that cyberstalking 
case severity increases if the stalker uses media capable of supporting verbal 
communications.  
CMC Channel Interactivity (H6)
Hypothesis H6 postulated that severity of cases using interactive media 
supporting real time communications would be more severe than cases using media that 
only support delayed communications. Before looking at the main effects, the 
interactivity variable was tested against the combined prior relationship plus context 
variable established above to determine if the established effect of intimacy plus context 
affected the interactivity results. This interaction test failed to show a significant 
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interaction term (F(10, 771) = 0.493, p = 0.895, power at  = 0.05 is 0.261), thus the 
analysis of the interactivity main effects term resumed. This showed that the interactivity 
construct provides a barely statistically significant impact on case severity (F(2, 771) = 
3.183, p = 0.042, power at  = 0.05 is 0.609). Figure 12 charts the mean severity levels 
actually measured, along with the relative levels predicted above.  
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Figure 12: Chart of Media Interactivity Mean Severity Levels 
 
The interactivity variable divides into two groups based on Tukey’s HSD test: real 
time only and delayed only cases were not different from each other, and both were less 
severe than cases that used both types of media, as shown in Table 16. Tests of the 
severity between classes within the interactivity variable showed a (just) significant 
difference between delayed cases and mixed (mean difference 0.075, p = 0.041, using 
Bonferroni’s correction for multiple comparisons). The test for a difference between real 
time and mixed cases (mean difference 0.070, p = 0.201), and the comparison between 
delayed and real time cases (mean difference 0.006, p > 0.999) failed to show a 
significant difference of means. All executed tests concurred in this comparison. 
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Table 16: Interactivity Severity Means Comparison 
Tukey HSD Subset 
Interactivity N 1 2
Real Time 136 0.266 
Delayed 411 0.274 
Mixed 242 0.351 
HSD Significance 0.834 1.000 
This result is not the result that was postulated in H6. From this evidence, 
cyberstalking activities taken as a whole do not require particularly high levels of 
interactivity. This concurs with the evidence from Miller (1999a), Sheridan et al. (2001a) 
and others (Cupach and Spitzberg 1994; Finkelhor et al. 2000; Spitzberg 2002; Cupach 
and Spitzberg 2004) that immediate feedback is not required to elevate case severity 
associated with disjunctive relationships, and suggests that cyberstalking tasks are not 
associated with high levels of dynamic complexity. This evidence does not invalidate 
interactivity as a CMC construct, but shows that it is sensitive to the dynamic complexity 
of the communications task.  
CMC Channel Distribution (H7)
Hypothesis H7 postulated that the severity of cases using media supporting 
private communications would be more severe than cases using only media that support 
public communications. Before looking at the main effects, the distribution variable was 
tested against the combined prior relationship plus context variable established above to 
determine if the established effect of intimacy plus context affected the interactivity 
results. This interaction test failed to show a significant interaction term (F(9, 772) = 1.517, 
p = 0.137, power at  = 0.05 is 0.725) , thus the analysis of the distribution main effects 
term resumed. This showed that the distribution construct fails to provide a statistically 
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significant impact on case severity (F(2, 772) = 0.492, p = 0.611, power at  = 0.05 is 
0.131). Figure 13 charts the mean severity levels actually measured, along with the 
relative levels predicted above.  
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Figure 13: Chart of Media Distribution Mean Severity Levels 
 
All executed tests concurred in this comparison. Again, this result is not the result 
that was postulated in H7. This result shows that control over the distribution of 
communications does not lead to higher cyberstalking case severity. This demonstrates 
that cyberstalking activities generally are not affected by the choice of distribution. 
However, this data and analysis fails to test for the difference in effectiveness of specific 
types of activities as affected by the distribution mechanism used, which is still likely to 
have an impact on the communications outcome.  
Post Hoc Analysis 
In addition to the analysis of the postulated hypothesis, the available data made it 
possible to examine two more questions as a post hoc activity. The first is an extension of 
the CMC analysis, which looks at the actual media selected by the harasser, to see if there 
are any interesting correlations of case severity with specific media that is not captured in 
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the primary analysis. The second looks at the impacts of gender, both for the victim and 
for the harasser, on the severity of the case. The results of each of these analysis follow.  
Online Media Usage Results
Because cases often escalated using different media, leading to use of several 
media in a single case, the media reported for the initial harassment was used to look at 
case severity by media. The ANOVA results indicated significant between class 
differences (F(14, 753) = 3.612, p < 0.001, power at  = 0.05 is greater than 0.999). Tukey’s 
HSD test identified two groups that strongly overlapped, as shown in the following Table 
17.  
Table 17: Initial Media Severity Means Comparison 
Tukey HSD Subset 
Initial Media  N 1 2
Unknown 2 0.141 
EBay 34 0.221 0.221 
Lists 23 0.230 0.230 
Instant Messaging 102 0.270 0.270 
Message Boards 111 0.272 0.272 
Game Forums 14 0.293 0.293 
Email 278 0.294 0.294 
Chat 72 0.296 0.296 
Usenet 18 0.317 0.317 
Blog 13 0.326 0.326 
Website 60 0.344 0.344 
Phone 12 0.344 0.344 
Hacking 2 0.364 0.364 
Offline 3 0.409 
HSD Significance 24 0.426 
Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 8.389. Type I error levels are not 
guaranteed. Alpha = 0.05. 
 
However, post hoc pair-wise comparisons failed to show any real differences 
between the media types. The comparisons of means failed to show significance for all 
combinations except for offline with Ebay, email, instant messaging, list groups, message 
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boards (all significant at p < 0.005) and chat (p = 0.022) (all adjusted for multiple 
comparisons with Bonferroni’s technique). Based on this and the mean values shown in 
Table 17, it is evident that media that supporting voice and hacking are associated with 
the most severe cases of stalking, while all other types of media fail to have a significant 
impact on case severity. This result supports hypothesis H5, which suggested that 
severity will differ depending on the richness of the media used in a case, and more 
specifically, the ability of the media to support voice interactions. Finally, note that this 
result suggests support for Kock’s (2004) evolution of media richness theory, the 
psychobiological model of communications, which suggests that conveyance of speech is 
the primary difference between rich and lean media.  
Gender in Cyberstalking Data
A review of the literature reporting the gender of victims of cyberstalking found a 
discrepancy between cyberstalking and traditional stalking. In a study of the online 
victimization of youth, Finkelhor et al. (2000) reported that 51% of young victims of 
online harassment were male. Alexy et al. (2005), in studying cyberstalking among 
college students, reported that 42% of victims of cyberstalking were male, which is much 
larger than the ratio of 2.5 found by Spitzberg (2002) in a meta-analysis of 107 studies of 
traditional stalking. Other studies echoing Spitzberg’s findings include Tjaden and 
Thoennes (1998), Fremouw et al. (1997) and Sheridan et al. (2002) when studying 
traditional stalking. While some of these authors have noted the difference, none have 
suggested a cause. The WHOA data used for this project includes 854 female victims 
(74.5%), 261 male victims (22.5%) and 34 undisclosed gender victims (2.9%), for a 
female to male ratio of 3.31. Excluding clearly offline cases, there are 572 female victims 
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(73.8%), 180 male victims (23.2%), and 23 undisclosed gender victims (2.9%), for a 
female to male ratio of 3.17.3
Gender Results
In addition to reporting gender information for use by others, the effects of both 
victim and harasser gender on the severity of cyberstalking cases were analyzed. The data 
was tested for differences in cyberstalking severity by gender. This analysis failed to find 
a significant interaction between victim gender and stalker gender in a 3 x 4 factorial (F(5, 
757) = 1.022, p = 0.403, power at  = 0.05 is 0.368). Further, the analysis failed to find a 
significant interaction between the context of the relationship and either victim gender 
(F(9, 722) = 0.313, p = 0.971, power at  = 0.05 is 0.162) or stalker gender (F(12, 722) = 
0.779, p = 0.673, power at  = 0.05 is 0.465). Thus it does not appear that particular 
gender combinations within a relationship play a role in the eventual severity of any 
particular stalking case, once a pair of parties has connected, online or off.  
Separate ANOVA tests were run on victim gender and stalker gender for 
differences in severity by class. The test for victims failed to show any differences by 
class (F(2, 757) = 0.319, p = 0.727, power at  = 0.05 is 0.101), suggesting that there are no 
differences in severity between male and female victims. The test for stalker gender also 
failed to show significant differences in severity between gender classes (F(3, 757) = 1.226, 
p = 0.299, power at  = 0.05 is 0.330). It is then easy to conclude that the severity of a 
cyberstalking case is not correlated with the gender of either the victim or the stalker.  
 
3 Note that this lowering of the ratio supports a proposition that online harassment is less gender biased 
than offline harassment, but that it does not support ratios near 1.0 found by Finkelhor et al. (2000) and 
Alexy et al. (2005). Additionally, since this data comes from field complaints, there is a strong probability 
of self selection bias in this data that may be influenced by gender.  
79
Other Results
Further exploration of the data found no differences in severity related to victim 
martial status, victim race, WHOA advocate, or the year the case was recorded by 
WHOA. Two other demographics that have been noted by other researchers to be 
associated with stalking, economic status (Sheridan et al. 2001a) and sexual orientation 
(Finn 2004), are not available in this data set, and is thus not testable.  
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CHAPTER VI  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary Of Findings 
This research activity has attempted to identify how the use of computer mediated 
communications tools affect relationships that are disjunctive. To this end, a data set of 
cyberstalking cases from the online victim support group Working to Halt Online Abuse 
(WHOA) was used to test for various impacts of CMC media on the severity of the cases. 
The tests performed can be divided into two groups, those that address the CMC impacts 
on relationships between the victim and the harasser, and those that test for the impacts of 
CMC media on these relationships. Table 18 presents a summary of the ten hypothesis 
tested with this data.  
These results provide some evidence that disjunctive, formerly intimate 
relationships are affected by the context in which they exist, particularly when that 
context is online. Such online cases are less severe than their offline counterparts. The 
positive showing of the context versus the intimacy level was expected, since other 
research has shown that more intimate relationships generally have more severe cases of 
stalking in the traditional offline context (Brewster 2000; Spitzberg 2002; Spitzberg and 
Hoobler 2002; Sheridan et al. 2003; Cupach and Spitzberg 2004; Purcell et al. 2004). The 
impact of the online context is not constant across relationship types, since this data fails 
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to identify any differences in case outcomes for friendships and acquaintances across the 
online and offline contexts studied. The online versus offline context is the stronger of 
the effects observed with this data.  
Table 18: Summary of Hypothesized Results 
 Hypothesis Result 
Statistic
Sig. 
H1 Interaction exists between relationship context and 
intimacy level exists in cyberstalking cases. 
Supported F = 3.279
0.038 
H1A Offline intimate relationships will be more severe 
than online intimate relationships. 
Supported MD = 0.091
0.010 
H1B Offline relationships with friends and acquaintances 
will NOT be different from online relationships with 
friends and acquaintances. 
Supported MD = 0.035
0.299 
H1C Offline relationships with strangers will be different 
than online relationships with strangers. 
Not Supported* MD = 0.172
0.153 
H2 Relationship intimacy level is positively associated 
with severity. 
Supported F = 4.493
0.011 
H3 Offline relationships will be more severe than online 
relationships. 
Supported F = 16.481
< 0.001 
H4 Anonymity is positively associated with case 
severity. 
Not Supported F = 0.801
0.525 
H5 Use of verbal media in a case will be more severe 
than cases using only text media. 
Supported F = 6.525
0.002 
H6 Use of real time media in a case will be more 
severe than cases using only delayed media. 
Not Supported F = 3.183**
0.042 
H7 Use of private media in a case will be more severe 
than cases using only public media. 
Not Supported F = 0.492
0.131 
*There was insufficient data for a meaningful result, and no conclusions should be drawn from this result.  
**While the test showed significance, the direction of the result was not as postulated.  
 
This result may also mean that online relationships are simply not as intimate as 
offline cases are, and the known link between intimacy level and case severity in the 
offline context applies. While this analysis took steps to eliminate a noted bias toward 
offline cases, this effort may have been insufficient. Alternatively, it is possible to 
conclude that online stalking is simply not as effective at impacting the victim as is 
offline stalking, due to weaker tools or stronger defense mechanisms that can be used by 
the victim to protect themselves. 
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Next, the anonymity of the harasser was checked for its impact on case severity. 
The results show that this data fails to support the postulated connection between 
anonymity and case severity. This result is not unexpected, as there is little in the 
literature that suggests that anonymity has a significant role to play in stalking generally 
(Spitzberg 2002). The conclusion is that this research activity presents no evidence 
supporting anonymity as a factor in a stalker’s choice of media.  
In looking at the effects of CMC channel characteristics on cyberstalking cases, 
the results from this data set generally supported the intuitive estimate that cases 
involving face-to-face and phone interactions between victims and stalkers are more 
severe that cases involving only textual channels. This richness variable showed that 
cases using verbal communications (offline, phone) were more severe than purely textual 
cases. This finding provides partial support for the work of Koch (2004) who, building on 
the deep literature related to media richness theory (Daft et al. 1987; Carlson 1995; 
Dennis and Kinney 1998; Carlson and Zmud 1999), postulates that support for voice 
communications is the most important division between richer and leaner 
communications channels.  
On the other hand, neither the interactivity variable (real time vs. delayed) nor the 
distribution variable (public vs. private) showed significant differences between the 
categories tested. From this evidence, stalking activities taken as a whole do not require 
particularly high levels of interactivity. This concurs with the evidence from Miller 
(1999a), Sheridan et al. (2001a) and others (Cupach and Spitzberg 1994; Finkelhor et al. 
2000; Spitzberg 2002; Cupach and Spitzberg 2004) that immediate feedback is not 
required to elevate case severity associated with disjunctive relationships, and suggests 
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that cyberstalking tasks are not associated with high levels of dynamic complexity. 
Similarly, message distribution alternatives do not lead to higher cyberstalking case 
severity. The evidence examined here demonstrates that cyberstalking impacts generally 
are not affected by the choice of message distribution mechanisms. However, this data 
and analysis fails to test for the difference in effectiveness of specific types of activities 
as affected by the distribution mechanism used, which is still likely to have an impact on 
the communications outcome. 
Should the result shown here be supported by further research, it would appear 
that media channel richness has a correlation with the eventual effectiveness of a message 
delivered by a channel. In contrast, the interactivity and the distribution technologies of 
the channel do not affect stalking activities. This result, while not negating the still 
possible impacts of interactivity and distribution, validates Te’eni’s (2001) suggestion 
that the characteristics of a channel have an impact on the effectiveness of the message 
being delivered. In conclusion, this analysis of cyberstalking data provides support for 
Te’eni’s (2001) CAMOC model and its interpretation of media richness theory. Further, 
the analysis provides evidence that disjunctive online relationships are different from 
disjunctive offline relationships only when intimacy is involved.  
Implications for Researchers 
For researchers studying computer mediated communications and its associated 
applications, this study furthers by one small step the study of media richness theory, 
showing that there is a clear distinction between media that can support verbal 
communications and media that are limited to textual communications. At the same time, 
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the model used here derives from Te’eni’s (2001) cognitive-affective model of 
organizational communications, and provides some support for its conclusions about the 
interactions between a sender’s goals, strategies, the media used, the message, and the 
outcome of the communications process.  
On the social sciences side, and for many of the same reasons as noted above, the 
use of the AHP based approach taken here to calculate our dependant variable will have 
value among other researchers, in particular when the construct under study contains 
symptomatic items that can occur one or more times in a record. This study demonstrates 
its effectiveness when applied to measuring stalking’s impact on victims, with the caveat 
that the resulting measure of the outcome is not a normal curve. This can easily be 
corrected with the use of a transformation to correct for strong skewness. In this case, the 
cube root of the AHP index worked very well.  
Further, in the process of developing this index of case severity, the trio of experts 
disagreed with the general ordering of the seriousness of stalking activity types suggested 
by Spitzberg (2002). The experts suggest that hyper intimacy is much more serious than 
is suggested in the literature reviewed by Spitzberg, and that invasion, theft and 
vandalism is somewhat more so. This suggests that elements of the process could be used 
to identify the relative impacts of this type of case, and many others, leading to a better 
understanding of the implications of such activities and events for victims and others.  
Implications for Practitioners 
The approach used by this study to determine the dependant variable, 
cyberstalking case severity, should prove useful to practitioners. Such an approach allows 
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victim support or law enforcement personnel a quick method of cataloging harassment 
activities, which can then be easily translated into an index value representing a 
standardized case severity score. This measurement process uses a form of the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process that removes much of the subjectivity from the process, leading to an 
index value for each case that is largely objective, and certainly can be applied 
consistently across all cases. Such a score can be used to prioritize resource allocations to 
cases. It can also be used, once the process is fully validated and accepted, as a means of 
summarizing the effects of stalking and harassment on a victim for use in legal 
proceedings. It is even conceivable that a standardized questionnaire and scoring weights 
could be used to determine if a particular case of stalking is a misdemeanor, a crime, or 
an aggravated crime, by establishing specific levels of severity that mark the boundaries 
between such definitions.  
Limitations 
There are several limitations on the ability to generalize the results from this 
study. First, the data for this research came from actual field cases, and was not initially 
collected by the researchers. Most importantly, the case histories available were not 
directly taken from the inputs of the victims. Volunteer advocates working for WHOA 
summarized the cases in order to generate simple statistics for publicity and tracking 
purposes, and it is this summary information about each case that has been used in this 
study. There were substantial differences in the quality of the data as provided by the 
different advocates, and this led to difficulties in coding, most specifically in the 
variables used to calculate the dependant severity variable.  
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Coding of the data also identified a lack of data in three of the eight cells shown 
in Table 1 on page 20. The three empty cells are the delayed verbal private cell, the 
delayed verbal public cell, and the real time verbal public cell. At this time, there are no 
known applications that fit the real time verbal public cell, especially since a pure form 
appears impractical. In practice, all large public forums utilize various control techniques 
to allow only selected speakers to be heard, making them appear more like broadcasting, 
and limiting the opportunity for the occurrence of harassment. Both the delayed verbal 
private and delayed verbal public cells appeared in the WHOA data. Two cases of 
mentioned voice mail, and one case mentioned slander via a radio broadcast. The lack of 
voice mail in the data is most likely related to its tight coupling to the telephone, leading 
to its mischaracterization by WHOA volunteers as real time phone contact. YouTube 
failed to appear, most likely due to its late introduction (in February 2005) relative to the 
period covered by the WHOA data (2001-2005). With respect to the research results 
presented here, there is no expectation that inclusion of reasonable numbers of cases 
fitting into these three cells will substantially alter the conclusions made here.  
Areas for Further Research 
Capturing information about the duration of a relationship prior to its conversion 
into a stalking case will allow a test of Carlson and Zmud’s (1999) channel expansion 
theory, using the same techniques used in this study. WHOA has been working to 
improve their data collection techniques, specifically by capturing the victim’s reports 
directly into a database, so that such a study might become possible. Additionally, this 
may allow the errors introduced by the advocates in the current data to be eliminated, and 
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allow access to information that has not been captured in the summaries to date. Access 
to the victim’s report will allow the exploration of a variety of additional factors 
associated with cyberstalking, including case duration and better information on the 
identity and anonymity of the stalker, and will lead to an enhanced analysis of a number 
of the postulated effects studied in this project.  
Conclusions 
This research activity has proposed and used a novel and objective approach to 
measuring stalking case severity, and applied it to a substantial database of cyberstalking 
cases to good effect. The analysis of this data provides some support for the original 
hypothesis that offline cases would be more severe than online cases, and showed that 
severity is at least partly related to the type of relationship between stalker and victim 
prior to the initiation of the harassment. Further, there is some evidence that the richness 
of the media used has an impact on the outcome, namely that cases of cyberstalking are 
more severe when media supporting verbal communications are used.  
The implications are then that there are only some differences in the impact of a 
specific communications media characteristics on cyberstalking severity. Based on this, 
this study of cyberstalking supports the general aspects of Daft and Lengel’s (1986) 
media richness theory and the broader cogitative-affective model of organizational 
behavior developed by Te’eni (2001), but fails to find distinctions between a variety of 
CMC channels within the broader media richness model. Similarly, the results support 
Kock’s (2004) psychobiological model of communications, which postulates a difference 
between media that can support speech, and those that cannot. However this study fails to 
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find any significant differences in the capability of various CMC media to transmit 
persuasive messages high in cognitive and affective content. Thus, this research supports 
the premise of media richness theory that face-to-face communications is richer than 
phone, which is in turn richer than CMC media that is based on text communications.  
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APPENDIX A:  
CODING GUIDELINES FOR CYBERSTALKING DATA 
Project Objectives 
Recent research is showing that the Internet is having an impact on interpersonal 
relationships, often accelerating their development (Bargh et al. 2002; McKenna et al. 
2002), and in some cases, accentuating the problems (Thompson and Nadler 2002). One 
subset of interpersonal relationships includes those that fail to share a common goal 
between parties. One group of researchers labels this type of relationship as a disjunctive 
relationship (Cupach and Spitzberg 2004). When interpersonal relations break down, 
usually when one party decides to break up the relationship, a disjunctive relationship 
results. Until both parties accept the eventual outcome, the relationship remains in this 
disjunctive state. Disjunctive relationships are characterized by ongoing conflict, often 
taking the form of modest harassment, and occasionally leading to more severe extremes 
such as stalking. Online harassment and stalking are known as cyberstalking.  
This project is interested in the impacts of the Internet on stalking and harassment. 
Specifically, it studies the impact of the internetworking technologies on case severity. 
To that end, I have acquired five years of case histories of cyberstalking incidents from 
an online victims support group. Two main elements of this data are relevant to the 
research, the nature of the relationship between the parties before and during the 
harassment (the independent variables), and severity of the case (the dependant variable). 
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A third element of the data is postulated to act as a moderator: the characteristics of the 
communications technology used by the parties to the case.  
Nature of the Source Data 
Data comes from Working to Halt Online Abuse (WHOA), a volunteer 
organization that helps victims of online harassment identify their harasser and aids in the 
resolution of cases when their technology skills are needed. WHOA provides referrals to 
law enforcement and other agencies when the case merits such attention, and will assist 
such groups when necessary. In return, these agencies often refer less severe cases to 
WHOA and similar groups. WHOA’s case histories were not captured for use in 
extensive analysis and need significant recoding to be useful. A first pass examination 
provided the basis for the coding standards that are described below. The same first pass 
also took care of simple and objective items such as age, gender and race of the victim.  
Additional Directions
The order of the data rows has been uniquely randomized for each coder to 
minimize the effects of coder experience as they work through the data file. Please do not 
reorder the file, or add or delete rows or columns. This will aid in reordering the file for 
evaluation of inter-rater reliability and overall analysis.  
The Moderator Variables 
The first pass coding of the data identified some 40 techniques for using 
electronic communications to harass or stalk the victim. 13 of these appeared more than 
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20 times in the data, and are identified in the common tool column in Table A1 below. 
The remainder occurred less than 10 times in the initial coding.  
Table A1: Internet Communications Tools & Techniques 
Common Tools Uncommon Tools Unique Tools 
Email Trojan Horse Software False Report to Authorities 
Instant Messaging Posting of Pictures False Profile 
Message Boards Proxy Complaint Forged Account 
Phone Identity Research Paging 
Website Viruses Attempted IP Theft 
Chat Web Cameras Radio & Media 
Offline Fax SMS 
Listserves E-cards Spoofing 
Postal Mail Hijacked Email Stalking 
Ebay Directed Spam Subscribe to Groups 
Blogs Spyware Unwanted Subscriptions 
Usenet Wikipedia Web rings 
Hacking   
Game Forums   
Note that several non-Internet tools are included here, including postal mail, 
phone, fax, and others. These also provide value for this study, and should be captured 
accordingly. Cases that include physical contact, aggression or other activities that 
require physical contact or proximity should note this by setting the “Offline” value in 
addition to any other values identified.  
Coding Online Media Used in the Case
The first coding item is the media tool used for the first harassing message. For 
the common tools, code the tool name (e.g. Email). For uncommon and unique tools, 
code “Other” and be sure the tool is coded in the “other media type” column. If none at 
all are identified, mark the case as “Unspecified.”  
To code the media moderators, we take a symptomatic approach. There are 15 
columns in the data sheet, one for each common media type, plus “offline” and “other.” 
Code a “1” in a column if that media type is mentioned anywhere in the data for a given 
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case, “0” otherwise. (Do not code for any communications with WHOA, code only the 
communications between the victim and harasser.) Code every tool type mentioned. If 
any of the uncommon or unique tools are mentioned, code a “1” in the “other” column 
and note the tool type(s) in the adjacent “other media type” column. If, in your opinion, 
you identify a new tool type here, please added it to the “other media type” column, and 
make a note of it for my use later. If none at all are identified, mark all the tool columns 
“0” for not used.  
The Independent Variables 
There are three independent variables that are postulated to affect the severity of a 
cyberstalking case, the nature and intensity level of the relationship, anonymity of the 
perpetrator, and the locus of the context of the relationship, e.g. did the relationship exist 
online or offline.  
Coding the Nature of the Relationship
Offline stalking identifies a correlation between the nature of the relationship 
between the victim and the harasser. Generally, the closer the prior relationship between 
the parties, the more severe is the impact on the victim. The labels provided in Table A2 
should be used to capture the nature of the relationship:  
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Table A2: Relationship Intimacy Levels 
Spouse Current or former spouse 
Intimate Current or former intimate; girlfriend; boyfriend; implies 
mutual effort by the parties to establish a relationship with 
a “significant other.”  
Friend Friend or confidant; not intimate, but close and implies a 
mutual commitment to the relationship 
Acquaintance Someone known to the victim in a casual or professional 
setting; classmate; coworker; manager; service provider. 
Includes friends of friends and former partners of current 
intimates or spouses.  
Family Any member of the victims extended family, including family 
of current or former partners, but excluding current or 
former partners.  
Unknown Strangers and others when the true identity is unknown to 
the victim.  
Coding for Anonymity
The Internet provides useful capabilities for individuals to hide their true identity 
from others. Harassers can use this to induce fear in their victims. To see if this has a real 
impact in online circumstances, we need to code the case for the likely anonymity of the 
harasser. Because identities can be discovered, we use the beginning of the harassing acts 
as the point in time to determine if the harasser is attempting to maintain anonymity. Use 
the codes identified in Table A3 to code for anonymity.  
Table A3: Anonymity Codes 
Anonymous When the true identity of the perpetrator is unknown to the 
victim when the harassment began.  
Not Anonymous When the true identity of the perpetrator is clearly known to 
the victim when the harassment began.  
Unknown Cases where anonymity cannot be determined from the 
information available in the case record.  
Note that strangers are different from anonymous stalkers. A stranger is someone 
unknown to the victim, but who does not try to hide their identity. An anonymous stalker 
may be a stranger, but may also be a former intimate, friend or family member. The latter 
seeks to hide their true identity from the victim, while the former does not.  
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Coding for Relationship Context & Evolution
In our research, we are seeking to understand if the context of the relationship has 
an impact on the eventual severity of the case. We are interested in two loci, whether the 
relationship exists online or offline. In some cases, online cases move offline as the 
relationship evolves, and we can use this information as well. This information is not 
clearly identified in the source data, and must be derived from the case content. Use the 
labels in Table A4 to capture the context of the relationship: 
Table A4: Context of Relationship 
Online Originally and still purely online. The parties have never met 
face to face.  
Offline The parties originated the relationship using traditional 
means offline, but the harassment included online 
activities.  
On2Off A relationship that began online, but moved offline over 
time. This will not be common. Cases where the 
harassment began well after the relationship moved offline 
should be coded “Offline.”  
Unknown Cases where there is insufficient data to determine the 
context of the relationship. These cases will be excluded 
from portions of the analysis.  
The Dependant Variable Components 
Stalking always consists of multiple acts that the victim perceives as threatening. 
To measure the seriousness or severity of each case, we take a symptomatic approach, 
and then apply the Analytic Hierarchy Process to determine weights for each symptom 
identified, which are then summated case by case into a severity score. This relies on 
binary coding for the presence (or not) of a particular type of action as recorded in the 
case history. In order to make the resulting severity score more reliable, we are coding 
each case in three domains: the presence of threats to the victim, actions taken by the 
perpetrator against the victim, and information about the eventual result of the case.  
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Coding Threat Information
To code the threat information, we take a symptomatic approach. There are 6 
columns in the data sheet, one for each threat type identified below, plus “no threats.” 
Code a “1” in a column if that threat type is mentioned anywhere in the data for a given 
case, “0” otherwise. This approach allows us to identify if multiple different types of 
threats were recorded in each case. Table A5 defines each of the threat types, and is 
derived in part from (Spitzberg 2002).  
Table A5: Codes for Threat Information 
Information Release Disclosure of personal information; Outing; Blackmail.  
Other threats 
(unspecified) 
General threats; Emotional threats; Self harm; Suicide; 
Threatening calls/letters/gifts/messages.  
Property Damage Threats against property or other tangibles; Threats to 
hack computers, hijack email, etc.; Threatened or 
actual theft of property; Breaking & entering.  
Friend, family or pets Specific threats against friends, family, or pets; Verbal 
threats about partners, loved ones.  
Death threats Specific verbal or written death threats; Strong threats of 
violence towards victim; Threaten with a weapon. 
No threats No threats were identified in the case data 
Coding Action Information
Stalking is a series of actions that together induce fear in the victim. By 
themselves, these actions may not be a cause for concern. Thus we again take a 
symptomatic approach. There are 11 columns in the data sheet, one for each action type 
identified below, plus “no actions.” Code a “1” in a column if that action type is 
mentioned anywhere in the data for a given case, “0” otherwise. This approach allows us 
to identify if multiple different types of actions were recorded in each case. Table A6 
defines each of the action types, and is derived in part from (Spitzberg 2002).  
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Table A6: Codes for Action Information 
Courtship behaviors Engaging target as a stranger in unsolicited 
conversation in a public place; Offering to by a drink 
in a public place as a stranger.  
Overbearing or 
Obscene Actions 
Making obscene comments as a stranger; Asking for 
a date more than once after being refused.  
Impersonation Using the victim’s identity to make obnoxious or worse 
statements about others; Making offers on the 
victim’s behalf.  
Hacking, Trojans, 
spyware, etc. 
Misuse of computer networks to steal information; spy 
on the victim’s actions, or damage victim’s 
computer.  
Hyperintimacy Excessive courtship behaviors; Excessive 
communications attempts; many unwanted gifts.  
Pursuit, Proximity, & 
Surveillance 
Lying in wait; Synchronizing activities; Unauthorized 
photos; Following; Drive-bys.  
Invasion, Theft, 
Vandalism 
Property invasion; Information theft; Property theft or 
damage.  
Proxy Pursuit & 
Intrusion 
Involve 3rd Parties for information gathering or 
proximity opportunities; Intimidate via 
intermediaries.  
Intimidation, Slander, & 
False Charges 
Includes Sabotage and Reputational Harassment; 
Blackmail; Threats of disclosure to employer; 
Making false claims to CPS.  
Coercion & Constraint Extortion; Use of physical force; Kidnapping.  
Aggression Assault on property, pets, self, or others; Violence 
towards victim; Rape; Endangerment. 
In addition, there are two action columns for “No Action Data in Case” and “Was 
Not Harassment.” Use the first if the case is identified as a harassment case, but no action 
information is identifiable. Use the latter if the case was not harassment. Mostly, this will 
consist of “Spam”, along with a few other cases. Cases marked “Was Not Harassment” 
will be deleted from the database before any analysis is undertaken.  
Coding Result Information
Table A7 captures most of the outcomes of cases, where known. Identify the 
outcome of the case. If several items on this list are mentioned, code the most severe. The 
list is ordered in severity from least (top) to most severe (bottom). For items not 
appearing here, code the case as “Other: < type>”, replacing the <type> field to capture a 
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brief description of the outcome. For example: for a case might be coded “Other: 
Removed spyware”.  
Table A7: Codes for Result Information 
Advice Ignored Victim ignored WHOA advice; Also 2 way fights; 
Flame wars; Reporting party is part of problem. 
Harassment Ended Harassment ended after brief time.  
Material Removed Offending materials removed from web/blog/etc.  
Stopped Using Service Victim stopped using service; Avoided list/chat 
room/blog. 
Changed Online 
Identity 
Victim changed online identity; New email address; 
New chat room handles.  
Reported to ISP Victim or WHOA reported to ISP for action.  
ISP Banned Harasser The ISP hosting the service banned the harasser; 
Harasser’s accounts closed.  
Referred to Attorney Victim referred to Attorney for legal action or follow-
up.  
Referred to Law 
Enforcement 
Victim referred to law enforcement for legal action.  
Restraining Order Victim advised to obtain a restraining order, or has 
had one issued against harasser.  
Charges Pending Harasser has charges pending related to this case.  
Other Outcomes All other diverse outcomes, as “Other: <type>” 
Unknown The WHOA data provides no information about 
outcome, and all cases that are not harassment or 
stalking.  
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APPENDIX B:  
USE OF THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS 
In developing this research, it was necessary to identify and use an objective 
function for assigning a numerical severity score to each cyberstalking case. The inputs 
available included information on types of harassing acts, threats, and results that could 
be coded as present or not for each case. By establishing weights for each type of act and 
threat, the sum of the weights for acts and threats present in a case can be used as the 
severity score. What is required is a method for generating weights for each type of 
harassing act, threat, and case result found in the data. The Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) developed by Saaty and Vargas (Saaty 1994; Saaty and Vargas 2001) provides a 
mechanism for the production of such weights, among other uses. For example, Lee et al. 
(2001) use AHP as a means of determining criterion weights associated with a 
telecommunications network design problem, similar to the problem here.  
AHP originated in the decision sciences discipline as an approach valuable for the 
rational evaluation of pros and cons concerning different alternative solutions. When used 
to make decisions, AHP answers the question “Which one?” (Taylor 2004). The useful 
feature of AHP in this study is order ranking and weight assignment for each of the input 
alternatives. This can be accomplished using inputs from one or a very small number of 
subject matter experts knowledgeable in the relevant domain of interest.  
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In this study, these weights are used to calculate the severity score for each case. 
Taylor’s (2004 p372) spreadsheet implementation of AHP was used to generate weights 
for each item in the three separate data types in the case histories: harassing activities, 
threats, and case results. These weights are presented in Tables 8-10 in Chapter IV. The 
AHP process was repeated to establish relative weights for the three type areas (acts, 
threats, and results), generating the AHP weights given in Tables 11 in Chapter IV.  
Using AHP to Get Objective Item Weights 
The general mathematical process involved in AHP (when used as a decision tool) 
is to establish preference weights for each of the criterion (the higher level), and to 
establish preference weights for each alternative within each criterion area (the lower 
level). If needed, additional levels can be used to extend the technique to sub-groups of 
criteria (Taylor 2004).  
AHP begins by listing and defining the criterion and alternatives. In this case, we 
based the lists of harassing acts and threats on the work of Spitzberg (2002) as shown in 
Tables 8 and 9 in Chapter IV. A separate list of results was derived from the data, 
condensed into a smaller number of types, and is shown in Table 10 in Chapter IV. Each 
item was defined for use in a pair-wise comparison survey instrument, a copy of which is 
included in Appendix C. AHP uses a standard preference scale where the rater chooses 
values on a scale to describe a preference for one item over the other. This was modified 
for use in this study, to ask for the difference in severity of an act or threat, from the 
perspective of the victim and/or the criminal justice system. Table B1 identifies the 
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severity difference levels used in this activity, with the intermediate levels provided, but 
not named, on the survey instrument.  
Table B1: AHP Severity Difference Scale 
Severity Difference Level 
Numerical 
Value 
Equally Severe 1 
Somewhat More Severe 3 
Significantly More Severe 5 
Substantially More Severe 7 
Extremely More Severe 9 
The survey instrument, which appears in Appendix C, was distributed to a trio of 
professionals currently working in the domestic violence field. Their task was to estimate 
the difference in severity between pairs of activities, and pairs of threats. The trio of 
respondents included an investigative detective from a large metropolitan police force 
specializing in stalking and domestic abuse cases, and two members of a coordinating 
council on domestic violence serving the same metropolitan area. Inter-rater reliability 
for the three respondents was  = 0.820. The results of this survey were averaged item by 
item per Saaty (1994) and used as inputs into the next step of the AHP process. A less 
formal dialog was used to obtain inputs for the case results category with the staff at 
WHOA, identifying the severity difference levels for each pair of result types.  
Taylor (2004) presents AHP in a form suitable for calculation using spreadsheets. 
Using this method, the pair-wise severity difference levels were input into a pair-wise 
comparison matrix. This is a square matrix, with the survey’s averaged difference levels 
entered into the matrix array. When the row item is more severe than the column item, 
the difference level is entered. When the column item is more severe than the row item, 
the reciprocal of the difference level is entered into the matrix. The diagonal is filled with 
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value of 1.00 to show equality of the row and column. Table B2 shows this information 
for the threat items used in this study.  
How much more severe is the ROW over the COLUMN?  
 
The columns of this matrix are summed, and each element of the matrix is 
normalized by dividing every element by the sum of its respective column. Table B3 
shows the results of this process for threat items used in this study. Next, each row in the 
matrix is averaged. These averages are the weights attached to the (row) item, and make 
up the weighting vector necessary for this study.  
 
The output can be thought of as the distance between the items as spread out on a 
linear scale, with an overall range of zero to one, since the sum of the weights will always 
equal one. The same process was used to obtain weights for the list of harassing acts, the 
case result items, and weights for the overall factors of harassing acts vs. threats vs. 
results, as shown in Table 11 in Chapter IV.  
Table B2: AHP Threat Comparison Matrix 
Raw Score TIR TP OT FFP DT 
Threaten Information Release 1.00 2.00 0.23 0.14 0.12 
Threaten Property 0.50 1.00 0.23 0.17 0.13 
Other Threats 4.33 4.33 1.00 0.25 0.19 
Threaten Friends, Family or Pets 7.00 6.00 4.00 1.00 1.00 
Death Threats 8.33 7.67 5.33 1.00 1.00 
Sum  21.17 21.00 10.79 2.56 2.44 
Table B3: AHP Normalized Threat Matrix 
Raw Score TIR TP OT FFP DT 
Row 
Average 
Threaten Information Release 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.054 
Threaten Property 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.042 
Other Threats 0.20 0.21 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.136 
Threaten Friends, Family or 
Pets 0.33 0.29 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.358 
Death Threats 0.39 0.37 0.49 0.39 0.41 0.411 
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Because the inputs to this process are subject to human error and inconsistency, a 
consistency check process has been developed (Taylor 2004 p379-380). To measure 
consistency, the comparison matrix is multiplied by the weighting vector, with the 
resulting values divided by the weighting vector and averaged. The resulting average is 
used to compute a consistency index (CI) using the formula CI = (Average – n)/(n – 1),
where n is the number of items. If the CI equals zero, the inputs are perfectly consistent. 
More commonly, this is not the case, and Taylor (2004) provides a series of random 
indices (RI), one for each n, that have been calculated using randomly generated pair-
wise comparisons. The CI is divided by the RI. The resulting value should be less than 
0.10 to show that the inputs are reasonably consistent. The consistency check values for 
the items of interest here are shown in Table B4.  
Table B4: AHP Consistency Check Values 
Severity Factor Consistency Check Value
Activities 0.071
Threats 0.058
Results 0.072
Overall Factors 0.016
Using AHP Derived Weights to Calculate Case Severity Scores 
To develop the index of case severity, WHOA case data is scored with a Boolean 
value of one (or zero) showing the presence (or not) of each specific type of activity, 
threat, or result, respectively, within each category. An intermediate category score is 
calculated for each of the three categories of activities, threats, and results by multiplying 
the Boolean value for each item by its weight, and summing the resulting values. The 
three category scores are then multiplied by their factor weights and summed again, 
producing a single case severity score. The following equation summarizes this activity:  
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where  
iA = AHP weight for action type i, 1= iA , (from Table 8), 
jT = AHP weight for threat type j, 1= jT , (from Table 9),  
kR = AHP weight for result type k, 1= kR , (from Table 10), 
iA= Boolean indicating presence of action type i in case, 
jT = Boolean indicating presence of threat type j in case, 
kR = Boolean indicating presence of result type k in case,  
==++ 1RTA WWW aggregate factor weights (from Table 11), and 
S is the case severity score.  
 
111 
APPENDIX C:  
QUESTIONNAIRE USED TO DEVELOP AHP WEIGHTS.  
Cyberstalking Activity Severity Comparison  
Research Project Goals:  
Traditional stalking is defined generally as “unwanted persistent personal harassment.”
Stalking generally takes the form of a series of actions that independently may or may not be 
considered harassment. Cyberstalking is stalking perpetrated exclusively or largely with computer 
mediated communications and/or other online applications and services. In other words, using the 
Internet. This research project attempts to analyze records of historical cases of cyberstalking and 
online harassment to understand the forms that cyberstalking takes, and how the Internet has 
affected traditional stalking. For instance, it appears that men are victims of cyberstalking more 
often than would be expected, based on traditional stalking data. We want to know first if this is 
true, and if so, why. We also wish to determine if the Internet provides opportunities for 
harassment that have yet to be examined by researchers, by looking at cyberstalking case 
histories.  
Stalking can encompass many actions. Such actions may, for instance, include sending 
excessive cards, letters, emails, or unwanted gifts, inappropriate physical approaches, ingratiation, 
surveillance, following, information theft, property invasion, theft or damage, verbal or non-
verbal intimidation, reputational harassment, threats, coercion, extortion, and various forms of 
criminal aggression including attacking pets, assault, and rape.  
Purpose of this Questionnaire:  
To achieve our research goals, we need to characterize online actions that can be a part of 
cyberstalking as well as traditional stalking. A critical component of this is to understand the 
relative levels of severity represented by each stalking action type in comparison with other 
stalking actions. This survey will be used to measure the perceived differences in severity for 
paired stalking actions and threats. The resulting data will be mathematically combined with the 
historical data to develop a severity score for each case. That case severity score will then be used 
in combination with other information to inform our broader research into cyberstalking.  
The specific approach we are taking for this measurement is known as Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP). AHP allows us to determine severity weights for each category and 
factor in our research data. AHP depends on the input of values from a decision maker or other 
expert in the relevant field. Finally, we intend to combine these weights with data coded from the 
historical case records to get an overall severity score for each case. This will be used as a 
dependant variable to answer a variety of detailed research questions using statistical analysis 
techniques on the coded historical data.  
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Cyberstalking Activity Severity Comparison  
Below is a list of personal threat type pairs. Each threat type can be an element of a stalking/ 
cyberstalking case. Using the check box, please identify which action is more severe, from the 
perspective of the victim and/or criminal justice system. Then, using the rating scale, specify the 
difference in severity between the two cases by circling a number. Circle “1” if both are equal in 
your mind.  
Definitions for Threat Categories 
Threaten to release personal 
information 
Disclosure of personal information; Outing; Blackmail.  
Threaten property damage Threats against property or other tangibles; Threats to hack 
computers, hijack email, etc. 
Other (unspecified) threats General threats; Verbal threats about partners, loved ones; 
Emotional threats.  
Threaten friends, family, or pets Specific threats against friends, family, or pets.  
Verbal or written death threat Specific verbal or written death threats.  
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1 Other (unspecified) threats Threaten to release personal information 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
2 Threaten property damage Other (unspecified) threats 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
3 Threaten friends, family, or pets Threaten property damage 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
4 Verbal or written death threat Threaten friends, family, or pets 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
5 Threaten to release personal information Threaten property damage 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
6 Other (unspecified) threats Threaten friends, family, or pets 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
7 Threaten property damage Verbal or written death threat 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
8 Threaten friends, family, or pets Threaten to release personal information 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
9 Verbal or written death threat Other (unspecified) threats 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
10 Threaten to release personal information Verbal or written death threat 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
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Below is a list of stalking action pairs. Each action can be an element of a stalking/cyberstalking 
case. Using the check box, please identify which action is more severe, from the perspective of 
the victim and/or criminal justice system. Then, using the rating scale, specify the difference in 
severity between the two cases by circling a number. Circle “1” if both are equal in your mind.  
Definitions for Stalking Activity Categories 
Courtship behaviors Engaging target as a stranger in unsolicited conversation in a public 
place; Offering to by a drink in a public place as a stranger.  
Overbearing or Obscene Actions Making obscene comments as a stranger; Asking for a date more than 
once after being refused.  
Impersonation Using the victims identity to make obnoxious or worse statements 
about others; Making offers on the victim’s behalf.  
Hacking, Trojans, spyware, etc. Misuse of computer networks to steal information, spy on the victim’s 
actions, or damage victims computer.  
Hyperintimacy Excessive courtship behaviors; Excessive communications attempts; 
many unwanted gifts.  
Pursuit, Proximity, & Surveillance Lying in wait; Synchronizing activities; Unauthorized photos; 
Following; Drive-bys.  
Invasion, Theft, Vandalism Property invasion; Information theft; Property theft or damage.  
Proxy Pursuit & Intrusion Involve 3rd Parties for information gathering or proximity 
opportunities; Intimidate via intermediaries.  
Intimidation, Slander, & False 
Charges 
Includes Sabotage and Reputational Harassment. Blackmail; Threats 
of disclosure to employer; Making false claims to CPS.  
Coercion & Constraint Extortion; Use of physical force; Kidnapping.  
Aggression Assault on property, pets, self, or others; Violence towards victim; 
Rape; Endangerment;  
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1 Obnoxious or Obscene Actions Courtship behaviors 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
2 Hacking, Trojans, spyware, etc. Impersonation 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
3 Impersonation Obnoxious or Obscene Actions 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
4 Hyperintimacy Hacking, Trojans, spyware, etc. 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
5 Invasion, Theft, Vandalism Pursuit, Proximity, & Surveillance 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
6 Intimidation, Slander, & False Charges Proxy Pursuit & Intrusion 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
7 Pursuit, Proximity, & Surveillance Hyperintimacy 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
8 Coercion & Constraint Intimidation, Slander, & False Charges 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
9 Proxy Pursuit & Intrusion Invasion, Theft, Vandalism 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
10 Aggression Coercion & Constraint 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
11 Courtship behaviors Hacking, Trojans, spyware, etc. 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
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12 Impersonation Pursuit, Proximity, & Surveillance 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
13 Hacking, Trojans, spyware, etc. Invasion, Theft, Vandalism 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
14 Obnoxious or Obscene Actions Hyperintimacy 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
15 Invasion, Theft, Vandalism Coercion & Constraint 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
16 Hyperintimacy Proxy Pursuit & Intrusion 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
17 Proxy Pursuit & Intrusion Aggression 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
18 Pursuit, Proximity, & Surveillance Intimidation, Slander, & False Charges 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
19 Proxy Pursuit & Intrusion Courtship behaviors 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
20 Coercion & Constraint Impersonation 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
21 Intimidation, Slander, & False Charges Obnoxious or Obscene Actions 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
22 Aggression Hacking, Trojans, spyware, etc. 1 –– 2 –– 3 –– 4 –– 5 –– 6 –– 7 –– 8 –– 9 
Demographic Information 
This information will be used to characterize your expertise in our reports on this research. No 
personally identifiable information will be used or publicly disclosed. Location specific 
information will not be used (e.g. city names).  
What is your job title? ___________________________________________________________  
What organization do you work for? ________________________________________________  
How long have you been working with victims or in the criminal justice system?_____________  
Briefly describe your experience with stalking or harassment cases or victims:  
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